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In the post-cold war period, while the danger of a global war has diminished, the dynamic of multilateralism has increased the risk of nuclear proliferation.
In the pursuit of international security significant achievements have been made. The 1991 Treaty on Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START I) resulted in deep reductions of the 2 Superpowers arsenals and in the removal of all nuclear weapons from Belarus, Kazakhstan and Ukraine. The 1993 START II Treaty will allow further reductions. The 1968 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was extended indefinitely as a successful result of the 1995 Review and Extension Conference. The decision avoided extremely damaging consequences and the consistently increasing number of Parties to the Treaty has secured its legal foundations.
Nevertheless, a too optimistic judgement might be regarded as superficial. The continuing existence of nuclear weapons and fissionable material in unstable countries constitutes itself a potential threat. Three States with unsafeguarded nuclear facilities remain outside the NPT: although the near universalization of the Treaty has enhanced pression on India, Israel and Pakistan to clear their nuclear stance, as Argentina, Brazil and South Africa have already done, their persisting absence from the Treaty undermines the credibility of non-proliferation regime. The recent activities of 2 Non Nuclear Weapon States Parties to the NTP, Iraq and North Korea, highlight the imperative of changing the conceptual bases and the detailed application of the safeguards system administrated by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).
Therefore, the rapid implementation of the "Programme 93 + 2", embarked by the Agency in 1993, represents a high priority to handle effectively future non-compliance situations.
Finally, NPT near universality strengthens demands for the 5 Nuclear Weapon States to engage in a clearly defined and time-bound programme of complete disarmament. In the pursuit of this long term goal, while at the Geneva Conference on Disarmament a fissile material production cut-off Treaty seems to acquire almost universal support, the recent signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, after its approval by the UN General Assembly, opens significant prospects and provides an enhanced confidence in a increasingly integrated nuclear non-proliferation regime.