New Threats and the Future of Transatlantic Cooperation

Leo Michel

Senior Research Fellow
Institute for National Strategic Studies - National Defense University

Rome, Link Campus University of Malta, 8 June 2006

On occasions such as this, I recall the wise advice of Muriel Humphrey.
In 1968, her husband, Vice President Hubert Humphrey, was preparing to deliver a speech accepting the Democratic Party presidential nomination.
She warned him: "Remember, Hubert, in order to be immortal, your speech must not be eternal!"
Well, the Vice President ignored his wife, spoke too long, lost his audience...and eventually lost the election.
I will try not to repeat his mistake.
 
The question posed by this conference-- do we, the United States (U.S.) and Europe, have a common destiny in regard to international security?—is not new.
 
Since 1949, NATO--the anchor of transatlantic security cooperation--has surmounted numerous challenges:  the integration and rearmament of Germany beginning in 1955; the Suez Crisis in 1956; France's withdrawal from NATO's Integrated Military Structure in 1966; near war between Turkey and Greece in the 1970s; the deployment of U.S. intermediate range nuclear systems in the 1980s; and, in the 1990's, the launch of NATO's first military operations in Bosnia and Kosovo.
 
Ultimately, NATO remained strong and resilient because its members did not allow their differences to overpower their shared interests and values.
 
But is this still the case today, and will it remain true in the future?
 
In 2002—nearly a year before the beginning of the war in Iraq--the American analyst Robert Kagan warned: "It is time to stop pretending that the Europeans and Americans share a common view of the world…On major strategic and international questions today, Americans are from Mars and Europeans are from Venus.  They agree on little and understand one another less and less."
 
Personally, I do not with Kagan's conclusion, but I do not think that we can be complacent.
 
In my view, the future of transatlantic security relations will depend, to a large degree, on how we respond to four strategic challenges.
 

• First, can we forge a strong transatlantic consensus on security threats and how to counter them?
   
  
• Second, can we narrow the gap between U.S. and European military capabilities?
   
• Third, can we make needed improvements on how the Alliance decides upon and conducts increasingly complex and costly military operations?
   
• Fourth, can we build a close and mutually-reinforcing relationship between an enlarged NATO and European Union (EU)?

Let me turn first to threat perceptions and response strategies.
 
Since the end of the Cold War and the disappearance of the once-powerful Soviet military machine, the Alliance has had to redefine its views on key threats to Euro-Atlantic security.
After the fall of the Berlin wall in 1989 and some early questioning of NATO's relevance, several developments in the 1990s—especially NATO's role in the Balkans--sustained interest in the Alliance.
 
Nevertheless, by early 2001, a transatlantic threat perception "gap" seemed to have taken hold.
 
European governments were mainly focused on preparing for EU enlargement, and most did not want to consider extended military involvement in crisis management beyond Europe or to devote the needed resources to restructure their forces.
 
In contrast, the U.S., due in part to its advanced conventional military capabilities and broad global commitments, became increasingly concerned with new "asymmetric" threats to ourselves and our Allies, including the potential use of weapons of mass destruction by international terrorists or "rogue" states.
 
For the U.S., the terrorist attacks of 9/11 and subsequent terrorist actions worldwide confirmed that asymmetric threats are real, not theoretical.
 
In light of those attacks, and with the conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq, the American leadership and military considers itself to be at war—not a traditional sort of war, of course, but certainly a long, multi-dimensional struggle against violent extremists who threaten vital interests of the U.S. and its allies and partners.
 
General John Abizaid, who commands U.S. forces in the Middle East and Afghanistan, recently called this "the first war of globalization, between openness and closed societies."
However, it has not always been clear whether 9/11 has fundamentally reshaped the threat assessment of a number of European governments, political elites, and publics.
 
Despite the attacks in London, Madrid, and Turkey, many seem to consider the threat of catastrophic terrorism, possibly including weapons of mass destruction, as rather abstract and, in any event, aimed more at America's homeland and overseas interests than at Europe's.
 
To be blunt, depending on where one lives in Europe, catastrophic terrorism may seem more--or less--of a concern than unsettled questions involving the Balkans or Russia's future direction.
 
Moreover, differences in threat perceptions have not been simply a transatlantic phenomenon; European governments, as we all know, have had strong and, at times, bitter differences over Iraq.
 
But I also see signs that a new transatlantic consensus is taking shape.
 
When I read the defense and security strategy documents published beginning in 2003-2004 in Germany, France, Poland, Denmark, Norway, and the United Kingdom, I see a growing convergence around a set of common threats:  international terrorism, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, regional conflict, and failed or failing states.
The EU's European Security Strategy of December 2003 listed exactly those threats, and added that of transnational organized crime.
 
Except for that addition, NATO declarations list essentially the same threats, as does the National Security Strategy document approved by President Bush.
 
The EU strategy emphasizes non-military tools to prevent and diffuse crises, but hardly strikes a pacifist stance.
 
And to be fair, NATO and White House pronouncements recognize that states must use all their tools, not just the military, to meet 21st century threats.

Of course, even in instances where their threat assessments do not vary widely, Allies may disagree over the appropriate strategy to meet those threats.
 
But here, too, things are changing.
 
In March 2005, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld released the National Defense Strategy, which represents his broad policy guidance to the Defense Department.
 
When you read this document, it is clear that U.S. experience in Iraq and Afghanistan, in particular, has underscored that the U.S. needs stronger and broader international partnerships to meet its strategic objectives and defend its homeland and interests.
 
As the document states quite bluntly: "The U.S. cannot achieve its defense objectives alone."
 
Hard experience has increased recognition by Washington that a wide range of non-combat military activities, including training and humanitarian assistance, as well as non-military efforts-- such as diplomacy, strategic communications, law enforcement, intelligence and financial cooperation--must be used to prevent problems from becoming crises and to deal with the aftermath of violent conflict.
 
Indeed, a Defense Department directive issued in November 2005 declared: "Stability operations are a core U.S. military mission that the Department...shall be prepared to conduct and support.  They shall be given priority comparable to combat operations."
 
This is a significant departure for an administration that, in earlier years, criticized "nation building" as an inappropriate and wasteful use of U.S. military resources.

This is not just rhetoric:  this new approach is already evident in the way the U.S. is developing doctrine and training for military operations, and in the way we are cooperating with Allies and Partners—for example, in developing a more common approach to civil-military cooperation.
 
One sees parallel developments in other areas, as well.
 
Since early 2005, for example, we have seen the U.S. working very closely with the "EU-3"—the UK, France, and Germany—to resolve concerns with Iran's nuclear programs through diplomatic means.
 
Last week, Secretary of State Rice announced that as soon as Iran fully and verifiably suspends its enrichment and reprocessing activities, the U.S. will join the EU-3 and meet with Iran's representatives.
 
We also have seen a growing pattern of cooperation between the U.S. and EU, and bilaterally with European governments, on issues ranging from combatting terrorism to supporting democratic processes in Ukraine, and from improved energy security to support for the difficult Middle East Peace Process.
 
Are there still differences of approach between Europe and the U.S.?
 
Of course there are.
 
For example, transatlantic consensus on when it is legitimate to use military force cannot be taken for granted and will depend on specific crisis situations.
 
Beginning in early 2002, U.S. official statements of willingness to consider preemptive action as a last option to prevent hostile acts threatening U.S. national security have raised concern in Europe.
 
And in the wake of Iraq, some European governments have argued that military action is illegitimate in the absence of a specific UN authorization—except for inherent right self-defense in response to an armed attack, as provided in Chapter 51 of the UN Charter.
 
Allow me three observations on this subject.
 
First, let us be honest: some of these very same governments did not take that view in the case of Kosovo in 1999, when NATO debated the issue but then took forceful action in the absence of a UN mandate.
 
Second, the U.S. is certainly not the only country to reserve a right to act alone, or within a coalition of the willing, when its vital interests are at stake.
 
In July 2002, one Allied leader stated that his country "wants to conserve the capability to act alone if its own interests and its bilateral commitments so dictate."
That was not President Bush.  It was Prime Minister Raffarin, speaking to France's National Assembly.
 
Third, not all Europeans categorically reject the concept of preemptive action.
 
NATO's agreed concept on countering terrorism includes, as one of its key principles, the prevention of terrorist attacks, and several Allied officials have echoed the U.S. contention that traditional concepts of deterrence will not work against terrorists or, necessarily, against failing or "rogue" states.
 
There is no easy or fast solution to rebuild a strong transatlantic consensus on threat assessments and response strategies.
 
But I think that three of the essential ingredients are:  improved intelligence-sharing and formulating common assessments at an Alliance level; enhanced formal and informal Alliance consultations on broad strategic questions before our national policies become set in stone; and continuing the progress in recent years to improve the tone of our transatlantic dialogue, even when we disagree on tactics.
 
I should turn now the second strategic challenge: dealing with the large gap between U.S. and European capabilities.
 
From Bosnia and Kosovo to Afghanistan and Iraq, the disparities between U.S. and Allied militaries have grown ever wider in key areas relevant to modern warfare, such as:  strategic transportation; support and logistics; sophisticated command and control, communications and intelligence-related systems; and precision strike weapons.
 
Allied leaders agreed at Prague in November 2002 to initiatives designed to reduce these disparities and to establish a highly-capable NATO Response Force.
For the most part, NATO will continue to depend on its individual member nations to provide the forces and capabilities needed for its possible missions, and progress here has been disappointingly slow.
 
Since 2002, several European Allies have begun to restructure their national forces to become more deployable, sustainable, and interoperable with each other and with the U.S.
 
Most European defense ministries, however, have been trying to shift priorities within low and essentially stagnant budgets.
 
Even in those larger European countries that have made modest increases in defense spending, the high costs of multiple out-of-area operations have put heavy pressure on both defense investment and personnel accounts.
 
The U.S. is certainly not slowing down; if you add in the costs of operations in Iraq and Afghanistan, the U.S. will spend over $500 billion on defense in the coming year, or about 3.5 percent of our Gross Domestic Product.
 
In comparison, European Allies together will probably spend about $200 billion on defense this year; and only a handful spend 2 percent of GDP or slightly more for defense.
 
More importantly, over the past decade, the U.S. has spent, on an annual basis, approximately 10 times as much as the European Allies combined on defense research, development, and procurement.
 
The issue is not whether Europe should match U.S .defense investments and capabilities—no one expects that.
 
And I did not come here to lecture you simply to spend more and more; it is important to spend wisely as well as to spend enough.
 
I have no easy solutions to offer, but I am sure these questions will be discussed extensively as NATO prepares for its summit in Riga next November.
 
One idea under consideration is for the Alliance to enlarge its common funding to purchase and operate strategic transport aircraft, similar to its fleet of Airborne Warning and Control aircraft.
 
Enhanced multilateral cooperation on capabilities can take many forms, but the essential point is that we cannot allow the capabilities gap to grow so large that it becomes ever more difficult to undertake joint military actions in Europe or elsewhere--even when the political will exists to do so.
 
Such a development could call into question the underlying political cohesion of the Alliance.
 
A final point on this subject: the U.S. is making significant reductions and redeployments affecting its military bases in Europe, including Italy.
 
Over the next few years, the U.S. will have closed dozens of bases and many dozens of smaller installations in Europe, returning over 40,000 military personnel, 65,000 Department of Defense civilian personnel, and over 57,000 family members to the U.S.
 
Meanwhile, an Eastern European Task Force is being established in cooperation with Romania and Bulgaria, which will host a relatively small U.S. force on a rotational basis.
 
While I believe these moves make strategic sense, I should note that some military and civilian observers worry that cutting the size of American stationed forces and their dependent communities might erode the quality of our professional military relationships and the political-cultural ties that they promote.
 
There are alternative ways to sustain professional military relationships through NATO and bilateral cooperation, both within Europe and in operations outside Europe.
But we need to give more thought to other ways to preserve the invaluable links that come from the daily interaction of American military personnel and their families with ordinary European citizens.
 
Regarding our third strategic challenge—the conduct of operations—NATO is struggling to adapt itself to the increased pace and diversity of its operational commitments.
 
Today, nearly 17,000 NATO and Partner troops continue peacekeeping duties in Kosovo, and approximately 9,000 are in the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan—and that number will increase to about 15,000 by the end of the summer.
 
NATO ships—anywhere from 8 to 25 at a time--are working with a few non-NATO partners to patrol the Mediterranean under Operation Active Endeavor, helping to secure Europe from terrorist attack.
 
In addition, NATO maintains a modest headquarters presence in Bosnia (around 200 personnel), maintains a small training mission in Iraq, assists with transportation, logistics and staff training for the African Union monitors in Darfur, and regularly provides specialized forces to enhance security at important European events.
 
These commitments, which are more likely to increase than decrease over time, raise a number of questions.
 
NATO takes decisions by consensus, not by vote, which gives every Ally a chance to be heard; the "consensus" rule is vital to preserve the "one for all, all for one" ethos of NATO—an alliance of sovereign nations.
 
But as the Alliance has enlarged and the political-military issues it must deal—especially in the post 9/11 period--with have become more complex, the process of finding consensus can become more difficult and lengthy.
 
In sum, it has become more difficult to strike a judicious balance between the political requirements of the Alliance and the need to plan for many contingencies and to react quickly to changing conditions.
 
As the number of operations increases, it also becomes more and more complicated for individual Allies to decide where and how to contribute their limited national forces.
 
Some continue to place conditions, or caveats, on how their national forces can operate within a NATO force, which limits the flexibility of the NATO commander to move and use forces as required to accomplish the mission.
 
This, in turn, can raise difficult questions regarding whether all NATO Allies are equitably sharing the risks involved in military operations—and there is no doubt that, in Afghanistan for example, the risks to European, Canadian, and U.S. forces within NATO are increasing as NATO's areas of responsibilities move into the south and, eventually, toward the east.
 
Finally, NATO operations certainly are not cost free.
 
Under current procedures, individual Allies essentially pay their own way when they contribute forces or equipment to an operation, which can be an important disincentive for some nations to commit forces even thought they politically support the NATO mission.
 
It is no surprise that Allied governments and NATO officials are discussing whether and how the Alliance might create some kind of common funding mechanism for NATO operations, and you might imagine how unpopular this could be with some foreign, defense and finance ministries.
 
Let me conclude on operations by pointing out that, in my view, the Alliance can never afford to fail, so it's vital that decisions to embark on operations are well thought out in advance and that the political and military commitment to see them through is strong.
 
Turning to a fourth and final strategic challenge, the relationship between NATO and the EU, several points are worth noting.
 
It has been seven and a half years since the St. Malo declaration by President Chirac and Prime Minister Blair, which said in part that the EU "must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises," and it has been three and a half years since NATO and the EU formally declared that they have a "strategic partnership."
 
I think that there is a compelling logic in favor of a close and cooperative relationship between NATO and the EU.
 
19 of the 25 EU member states are NATO allies, and four are active members of the Partnership for Peace and, hence, closely tied to NATO in terms of defense planning, operations, and political-military cooperation.
 
Logically, these 23 member states should not be schizophrenic, adopting different views of their national security interests depending upon whether they are looking through a NATO or EU lens.
 
Each of the 23 EU allies and partners has one set of military forces and, equally important, one defense budget.
 
These must serve national missions as well as those that might become obligated under NATO, EU, UN or "coalition of the willing" leadership.
 
Given the state of most European defense budgets and the growing demand for European forces to serve in crisis management operations, there is no room for wasteful and unnecessary duplication.
 
And when it comes to doctrine, training, and equipment interoperability, European military commanders understand that inconsistent practices could increase the inherent risk of military operations.
 
Moreover, European forces are increasingly involved in a common set of operations.
 
In Macedonia and in Bosnia, we have seen NATO-led missions transition to EU-led missions.
 
In Afghanistan, we have seen ISAF transition from an ad hoc coalition to a NATO-led force in Kabul, and within the next year, as I mentioned before, ISAF may extend its responsibilities over the whole of the country.
 
The EU, meanwhile, conducted an autonomous military operation in northeast Congo in the summer of 2003 and is preparing for another autonomous operation this summer in support of the Congolese elections.
 
But I should point out here that, as military operations are not always so predictable, it could happen one day that an operation begun as an "autonomous" EU operation might later need assistance from NATO.
 
So if the logic of a close NATO-EU relationship is clear, how are these two international actors doing?
 
The answer is mixed.
 
Beginning with the good news, the public rhetoric is correct; the Alliance's top political body, the North Atlantic Council, meets periodically with its counterpart, the EU's Political Security Committee; an informal dialogue has taken place in three meetings "at 32" (that is, foreign ministers from each of the NATO and EU member states) since the summer of 2005;  NATO's Military Committee meets periodically with its EU counterpart; and they agreed in late 2005 to set up small liaison cells in each other's military staffs.
 
The best news of all is that NATO-EU cooperation in Bosnia, despite some rough patches at the start, is going well.
 
But there is less than good news, too.
 
By most accounts, substantive cooperation between NATO and the EU on capabilities development and remains marginal.
 
We saw a very unfortunate beauty contest between NATO and the EU last summer involving, when both  UN Secretary General Annan and African Union (AU) Chairperson Konaré requested NATO and the EU to act quickly to support AU forces engaged in monitoring a shaky cease-fire, and some in the EU accused NATO of trying to "steal the show" in Darfur.
 
And earlier this year, France reportedly blocked an informal discussion between the North Atlantic Council and the Political and Security Committee on the subject of terrorism, a subject which logically should be of concern to both organizations.
 
One can find many explanations for why the NATO-EU relationship has been and remains difficult.
 
NATO and the EU are proud organizations but profoundly different in their structures, procedures, and ambitions.
 
At NATO, no one mentions any aspiration to realize "an ever closer union;"  political-military affairs clearly are the focus of attention, and member states become particularly "sovereignty-conscious" when deciding whether to send their young men and women into harm's way.
 
Italians need no reminder that the EU covers a vast range of activities—economic, monetary, social, legal and political—as well as a constellation of institutions—the Commission, Council, European Parliament, and European Court of Justice—that have no NATO equivalent.
 
Within the vast EU machine, its security and defense policy is not necessarily the highest priority of a number of member states, many of whom are reluctant, to say the least, of attributing any collective defense role to the Union.
 
Another factor is that NATO and the EU are both passing through difficult transformations.
 
I focused earlier on NATO's challenges, but you need little reminder of the difficulties facing the Union, which go beyond the impasse over the Treaty on a European Constitution.
 
Still, I am hopeful that, in the long run, the logic of NATO-EU cooperation will prove stronger than the elements of competition that arise from time to time.
 
One reason, I believe, is the evolution of the U.S. position.
 
It seems clear to me that the U.S. has come to understand that the EU must be an important partner in dealing with transatlantic and global issues that go beyond trade and investment.
 
I also believe that Washington has come to understand that it cannot keep EU ambitions in check by systematically playing certain Allies and Partners against others, since none of them wants to be manipulated or forced to "choose" between NATO and the EU.
 
At the same time, many Europeans seem to accept that the U.S., too, has legitimate concerns.
 
Will Europeans actually build the interoperable military and civilian crisis management capabilities needed to meet 21st century threats?
 
Equally important, will they act forcefully, either within the UN, or NATO, or in "coalitions of the willing" alongside the United States, or under an EU flag should diplomacy and economic inducements fail, as they no doubt will in some cases?
 
Certainly, most Americans do not react positively to the notion advanced by some in Europe that the EU must develop itself as a "counterweight" to the U.S.—a notion that has been explicitly rejected by a number of EU leaders.
 
But from my experience in the Pentagon and, during the last three years, at National Defense University, I believe that most American officials and military involved in European matters are not concerned that the EU will accomplish too much—but that it will, in the end, produce too little.
 
I realize that despite shared democratic values and security interests broadly speaking, NATO and the EU will remain profoundly different in structure, scope, and procedures.
 
In addition, the important place of the U.S. in NATO and its absence from EU councils greatly affects how those organizations decide and execute policies.
 
So some awkward moments between NATO and the EU are inevitable.
 
Still, as most Europeans and Americans want continued U.S. engagement with, not estrangement from, the Old Continent, I think we will find a way to meet this challenge.
 
I think of NATO and the EU as a dance couple, moving gradually from a minuet to a tango.
 
Every one of their members has a vital stake in this partnership, for if, in the end, one partner slips, the other surely risks stumbling, as well.
 
Grazie.