Stabilization and Reconstruction:
Political and Military Constraints Affecting Operations

Rear Admiral Jean Dufourcq

Chief Academic Research Branch, NATO Defense College

Rome, Center for High Defense Studies, 25th September 2006

Let-me just address this very question in two steps; first recalling briefly the European experience after the Second World War. Then speaking about constraints for the IC through sensitive issues: the central dilemma effectiveness versus legitimacy; the overall asymmetries and the space-time dimension (1).

1. References in European History.

At the end of the Second World War, both winners and losers in Europe and international society as a whole, were faced with a truly catastrophic post-conflict situation.
In view of the panoply of instruments employed to manage such a politically, economically and strategically difficult situation, the time it took the Europeans to become sufficiently aware of their collective European heritage, and how fragile that heritage still is, it is not surprising that we are encountering difficulties today in the Balkans, Central Asia and the Middle East.

In Europe a whole series of measures was required.

The role of protecting the continent to the maximum extent possible from external threats and safeguarding its freedom was assigned to the Atlantic Alliance and its military organization, resulting in security for the peoples of Western Europe.
The task of neutralizing opposing forces and judging violations of international law was handled by the courts, with the protection of the occupying forces.
Structural and economic rebuilding was initiated under the Marshall Plan, while political and strategic unification was fostered by the London and Paris agreements founding the Western European Union (WEU) in 1954, and the Rome treaty in 1957 establishing European Economic Community (ECC).
It took twelve years to reach this stage after the upheavals of the Second World War. The next stage was to develop the Common Market and to forge the Single European Act in 1986. In 1987, European security interests were addressed by the Hague Platform. Ten years later, at the Nuremberg talks in 1997, Europeans acknowledged their common destiny and concerns. In June 1999 at Cologne the member nations of the European Union decided to strengthen their Common Foreign and Security Policy by developing and pursuing a European Security and Defense Policy.

2. Political and Military Constraints Affecting Operations.

Today both NATO and the EU have undertaken post-conflict reconstruction activities within a tight framework of political and military constraints that hamper the conduct of their operations. Time, patience, creativity and flexibility are the key words here.

The impact of these constraints can be assessed from three central, complementary perspectives:

a) the effectiveness versus legitimacy dilemma;

b) overall asymmetries in reconstruction operations;

c) and the space-time dimension.

a) Effectiveness versus legitimacy

Post-crisis nation rebuilding usually starts from a chaotic situation or one that has seriously deteriorated. The objective is to achieve an "end state" of autonomous stability that can be sustained over the long term without the support of the international community. The definition of this "desired end state" is part of the crisis or conflict exit strategy, the broad outlines of which have been agreed by external actors.
The establishment of the necessary conditions for this "desired end state" places political and military constraints on the armed forces that on the whole restrict and circumscribe their action. A degree of military effectiveness has to be sacrificed in order to meet the non-military objectives that confer legitimacy on the action taken.

Here are some examples of the problem of legitimacy versus effectiveness:

Assisting and safeguarding the process of restoring state institutions, and maintaining the existing political balance, both overall and local, constitute a complex challenge. For example, the military logic of overall effectiveness would argue in favour of merging Operation Enduring Freedom whose mission is fighting terrorism, and the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) whose missions include providing security and supporting civil institutions in Afghanistan Political and legal logic, however, would contend that the two operations should be kept separate in order to preserve their legitimacy and their specific political profile.
The process of assisting the international and local authorities in their reconstruction efforts while supporting and safeguarding the various stages of return to a stable situation at a political pace acceptable to public opinion must not be disrupted or anticipated by a restrictive military calendar.
It is imperative to stay within the political and legal framework of the mandate given to the forces by the international community or the coalition. Whether the mandate is to conduct offensive actions to deter or intimidate some parties or defensive actions to protect others, the political, psychological and economic effects of the actions taken within the mandate on the populations concerned are of critical importance. The mandate's constraints can have a considerable impact on the conduct of operations (including their pace, tempo, and areas of deployment) and on the rules of behaviour and engagement, particularly when the principle of "restraint of force" is applied.
How can the traditional duty to assist a person in danger, or emerging responsibilities such as humanitarian intervention, or the completely new "Responsibility to Protect" that the UN is currently studying be incorporated into a precise political mandate?
At the contact forces level, the right mix of efforts, graduated action and the duty to be impartial demand firm control over military operations, and this limits the combatant's basic actions.

The effectiveness versus legitimacy debate is much more a police and law enforcement concern than a military problem; it is difficult to combine the right to wage war with socio-economic action in reconstruction operations.

b) Overall asymmetries in post-conflict reconstruction situations.

As a rule, any stabilization process preceding reconstruction is the result of a compromise between the antagonistic parties, who have been more or less forced by the international community to support a common strategy that (it is intended and hoped) will become a win-win strategy for all the parties involved. This creates asymmetries that impose constraints, frequently severe ones.

The opposing sides, which are often scattered, lacking in cohesion and structure, and inadequately or ineptly commanded, are pitted against centralized, mandated, and regulated international structures. On the one hand, the resistance fighters are prepared to risk their lives and their future; on the other hand, there is usually a high ranking political representative and a military commander, both bound by a mandate. There is a fundamental asymmetry here. The opposing sides, frequently obliged to accept compromises, as a rule have freedom of initiative — if not freedom of action — arising from the absence of a real mandate and the need to satisfy a clientele that in general is dissatisfied, victimized or turbulent, and always mistrustful. This asymmetry, which is frustrating for the mandated authorities, is illustrated by the Dayton agreement Bosnia-Herzogovina, the Marcoussis agreement (Ivory Coast), and the administration mission in Kosovo (KFOR, UNMIK).

In all reconstruction operations, as in all military operations, it is essential to maintain freedom of military action.

A dual civil/military asymmetry complicates overall action and results in one-sided ways of thinking that can often be destabilizing:
- The priorities and methods of the High Representative of the international community and those of the multinational force commander may differ. Often the military's plans and organization are in place well before the civilian authority's structures, because reconstruction operations are linked to stabilization operations and frequently cannot be started until a donors' conference has been held. One party may wish to negotiate first, while the other may prefer to enforce law and order; their views and calendars cannot be coordinated unless a proper balance is found between the carrot and the stick.
- The local authorities are often embryonic. The representatives of political parties, resistance fighters, and local warlords may not share the same immediate concerns. The gradual return to normal living conditions and the achievement of some form of sovereignty through a process of political and economic legitimization create new relations between local civilian and military personnel. This weakens the position of the military, who inevitably have their own agenda and (in some cases) want to replace the civilians.
- The coexistence of governmental with non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and of mandated forces with services financed by private networks and delivered by NGOs through diverse, often competing channels, can lead to imbalances, frustration and disarray, and can even rekindle the fires of conflict.

As a consequence, civil and military communications channels must be kept open between external and internal forces, and the international community must provide excellent civil-military coordination on a continuous basis.

There is often one last source of asymmetry within the multinational military community during both stabilization and reconstruction operations. It arises from specific national limitations (caveats) or missions (mandates). Such symmetries between the contingents (in addition to those in terms of expertise, organization, and logistics) make the forces' planning and reaction tasks more complex, whether it is a question of rules of engagement (ROE) or rules of behaviour in specialized fields (such as health, education, and infrastructure).

The overall asymmetries in reconstruction operations demand impeccably sequenced actions and meticulous civil-military coordination by the intervening organizations.

c) The space-time dimension.

This is a more familiar problem, and can be illustrated as follows.

Rapid rotations (every 4 to 9 months) of national contingents of intervention forces can generate problems and occasionally arouse the mistrust of the local population, who do not understand the need for such rotations but are affected by the constraints they impose.
Knowledge of the terrain is often incomplete or superficial, especially when intervention forces are dealing with rival parties whose psychological antagonism is deeply rooted in the distant past (as in the case of Kosovo and the Battle of the Field of Blackbirds in 1389). Tactical mastery of the terrain, and an understanding of climatology, economic exchanges, and the various socio-political and ethno-religious cultures resulting from very local experiences require constant vigilance and long term commitment.
The restoration of a climate of confidence and hope often depends on convincing economic results and a minimum level of socio-economic predictability, and these developments take time.

* * *

All these political and military constraints must be tackled before a reconstruction operation can start, and it is essential to foster dialogue and trust between the battered and bruised parties, who are forced to deal with their differences and frustrations in a framework imposed and regulated by external authorities.

The right mix of military force, political training and socio-economic legitimacy is required. As always in politico-military affairs, material assets need to be carefully combined with human resources.
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