Security Challenges for the Western Balkans
Dr. Ilir Gjoni
President of the Albanian Center for Public Policy and Security Studies
Rome, Center for High Defense Studies, 25th September 2006
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When we refer to security issues in a particular region as the Balkans is, we generally take a holistic view of security, referring to political, economic, social and environmental issues alongside the usual military concerns. By doing so, we sometimes run the risk of following a wrong path because the boundaries of what constitutes a security issue have become blurred, with concepts such as societal and economic security proving elusive to grasp. And if we cannot understand what security is, then, how can we know what measures we need to take to ensure that it is fostered? With this caution in mind, I will try to present some views on the new security challenges (societal and economic ones included) as perceived by countries of the region in particular my country, Albania.
For the first time in their history, the countries of the Balkan region are all democracies. Today the image of the Balkans is no longer that of a dark and dangerous corner of Europe, but a place where democratic governments are in place and progress is apparent every day. Please allow me to summarize what, in my perception, we do need and what we do not need in the region with particular reference to the security challenges of the region.
What we do not need is conflict and instability. We do not need ethnically clean regions. We do not need exclusion. We do not need division as a solution. We do not want Serbia & Montenegro on one side and Kosova on the other to become extremist. We do not want greater nations. We do not want populist monologues.
What we want is to get integrated into the EU and NATO. We want multiethnic societies. We want stability in the region. We want common voice in the region. We want Serbs, Albanians, Montenegrins, Macedonians, Bulgarians, Greeks, work together. We need constructive dialogues.
Settling the 'political uncertainties'
In the early nineties of the last century Western Balkans looked as if it was reverting to an earlier historical logic of territorial wars and ethnic homogenization. The question haunting everyone was: "Was this Europe's past or its future?" Grosso modo we have passed that dilemma, yet many unresolved issues remain high in the agenda. Western Balkans are now at a cross road and at one which, in many ways may be even more challenging than the past decade. What I call "political uncertainties" like Kosovo, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina remain stumbling blocks for closer integration of the Western Balkans with the Europe. Protectorates breed irresponsibility and lack of will.
Strengthening of Democracy
We should focus on creating Demos. Life has proved that it is stronger than Ethnos. This, to my opinion is the biggest challenge the countries of the region face, with direct impact on security as well. It is a fact that traditional security issues are overweighing issues of democracy building. This misbalance is for obvious reasons but it is dangerous for the fragile democracies of the Western Balkan countries. This does not mean that traditional security parameters should be overlooked. In my opinion they should go hand in hand. When you listen people of the region speak about problems of their countries, one is struck by the similarity of the problems. Almost all opinions expressed converge in one point i.e. creating demos.
Indeed, it is not by chance that the criteria that candidate countries should fulfill in order to join the Alliance with defense reform being a very important but not the only requirement are strongly related to the consolidation of the democratic institutions, imposing of the rule of law, and market economy, respect for the rights of national minorities, implementation of police and judiciary reform, and, importantly, contribution to multinational peace operations. Moreover, the assessments done within NATO as far as political criteria of NATO membership is concerned, to a large extent, rely on the expertise of other organizations that deal specifically with monitoring democratic standards. Specifically, NATO co-operates with the experts of the EU or the OSCE as well as with national experts.
Just as the nation-building process is more recent and compressed in the Balkans, so ethnic nationalism remains stronger and civic traditions more fragile than elsewhere. The post-Communist legacy presents for our region the need to develop political and social institutions to meet the needs of each state's citizens—the challenge of state-building at the most basic level. But we cannot do this alone.
Organized crime and corruption are huge endemic problems in the region. The fight against this scourge is a must for the survival of the nascent democracies in the region. Yet one has to caution between declared targets and hidden agendas. Having had a difficult dictatorial past, the public opinion is more worried about the possibility of a return to dictatorship than to have crime and corruption. Hence measures against these phenomena should address not only the facade of the problem, but its root causes. It has happened that under the disguise of the anti-corruption campaign, politicians in fact seek to eliminate their political opponents. Another dangerous aspect of this phenomenon is an evident attempt, mainly by the executive branch, to subordinate the judicial system. Instead, well-tested methods, such as strengthening constitutional institutions and their immunity to corruption, supporting independent judiciary, carrying out necessary economic reforms and promoting good governance should be the remedy for healing such a scourge.
Last but not least, the frequently neglected menace of emerging Islamic radicalism in the region. Due to the poor shape of the economy and the high unemployment rate, some young Muslims might be attracted to join fundamentalist groups.
Balkan's EU and NATO integration: 'Absorption Capacity' & 'Integration Fatigue'
For the 19th century scholars, to live in the Balkans literally meant that one was in Europe but not of Europe. Among the people of the Balkans a legend is told of a captive eagle that manages to escape from captivity and return to his family. But his master had ringed his claws, and this stigma makes the fugitive a stranger among his own race. The family refuses to take back their own.
This is what is worryingly happening these days in EU chancelleries vis-ŕ-vis Balkan integration. Some influential EU politicians (Stoiber of Bavaria) and institutions (EU Parliament) are giving a new innuendo to the term 'absorption capacity'.
In EU-speak, the term "absorption capacity" has been understood to refer to the need for the Union to define - or rather re-define - itself and its potentials in light of its further expansion that could, in due course, bring Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Turkey and the countries of the Western Balkans into the fold. Recently, however, "absorption capacity" also appears to be used in the context of overt or covert arguments against the Union's.
Another issue of concern is related to the Schengen Agreement, which controls and limits the flow of people across borders, and thus increases a sense of regional isolation from Europe. The unwitting results of Schengen, and lack of commitment of economic resources and attention, contribute to the region's sense of increasing "isolation" from Europe.
Moreover, the most recent EU visa policies make the situation worse. Not only EU has decided to double visa fees but very cunningly is trying to lure highly skilled immigrants, and to sell the idea, Mr. Franco Frattini (Franco) uses the term 'brain circulation' to counter the accusations of 'brain drain'. These moves do not aim at Europeanizing the Balkans; instead EU rich countries are trying to suck the talent and stalling the development of our region.
Membership in NATO now appears to be a cultural marker of inclusion and economic attractiveness as much as a security guarantee for countries of the region. Since EU membership criteria are so difficult to fulfill, NATO membership is the next best thing that assures security guarantees and makes a region more attractive for outside investments. NATO enlargement represents a historic process which has not yet reached fruition. It is an ongoing process. What is too often overlooked is that a larger NATO is also proving to be a stronger NATO.
Economy
Most citizens in the region define the risks to their security predominantly in domestic terms—from drug and people trafficking, terrorism, organized crime, and state corruption. The 1990s further radically altered the economic geography of the Balkans, shifting economic processes to focus on new markets and new partnerships. The region's legacy of a turbulent past, it marginal position at the "periphery" of Europe, and the lack of any economically dominant country willing to act as a driving force for the region simply assured continued underdevelopment. Critics of the arguments presented here—that the disparate economic geography of the region is the greatest inhibitor of long-term security—will point to milestones established by the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe, as well as milestones that are reported by the U.S. Department of State. Such milestones clearly dictate a methodology and roadmap for assessing strategic progress. But such milestones, to be blunt, are too bureaucratic and sidestep current reality.
The long struggle to create a nation-state- of which Yugoslav wars could be seen as the final phase- had taken the entire twentieth century. The irony was that just as this struggle ended, economic and political changes at the international level threw the very idea of the nation-state into question. The collapse of Communist one-party states signaled the most dramatic crisis of the old idea of socioeconomic transformation through the domestic policies of the individual state; but accession to the European Union in a more insidious and indirect way confronts future Balkan applicants with similar issues.
The dismantling of tariffs and protected state industries as well as the exposure to global competition meant the triumph of neo liberal forces. The traditional Balkan nation-state is no longer challenged by the old empires; it is not even challenged by the rivalry and hostility of neighbors; its main threat comes now from the international economy.
The problems and perspectives for the southeastern Europe today are not those of the past, but dilemmas familiar in one form or another to most European countries: how to reconcile older patterns of welfare provision with the competitive pressures of global capitalism; how to provide affordable energy while safeguarding the natural environment from pollution; how to prevent the total decline of rural ways of life, and to build the prosperous economies that alone will reduce the attractions of organized crime and allow democracy to flourish.
Thus for instance, the political leaders of the Balkans are in a difficult position when it comes to reforming the defense and security sector. As these reforms are costly, politicians from economically feeble countries are reluctant to increase defense expenditures. The only way to circumvent this thorny dilemma, in my opinion, is to adopt a realistic long-term reform plan unambiguously endorsed by all major political parties.
I would also like to draw your attention to the fact that, as yet, the Balkans has been unaffected seriously by the 'energy factor'. However, in the last year, there has been a dramatic increase in the power and influence of Russia, which seems to have become keen on using the so-called 'energy weapon' in politics. One should not exclude the possibility that Russian energy policy might soon begin to influence developments in the Balkans the way it did in Georgia, Ukraine and elsewhere.
Many in the region correctly see that economic stability is critical to their security. To the degree that EU remains distant and disengaged the feelings of isolation and abandonment will persist. If we don't then say hello to a secure Euro-Atlantic perspective and say goodbye to the Balkan syndrome than it was fun while the dream lasted.
The Western Balkans is very much a work-in-progress and will require the international community's continued sustained engagement. If we accept that our actions are correlated to the past than we should by reference also accept that to have a different future we should take actions correlated to the future we want to create.
There is an increased importance of 'soft security' in the region. The reform of military forces is currently less relevant than the reform of the police, criminal intelligence and the judiciary system. Defense and security sector reform must remain a key component for all Balkan countries in their attempts to move closer to the EU and NATO. The reform should be an integrated process involving the government, the militaries and the parliament. This process is, to a very large extent, an economic and social issue and accordingly needs to be dealt with in the context of economic reconstruction and social development policies. Sound border management and security is another issue to be addressed. Example, the Ohrid Process for Border Management and Security, a joint effort by the countries of the region, the EU, the OSCE, NATO and the Stability Pact addresses this very sensitive issue.
Additional regional agreements, to master cooperation networks such as, for instance, a Schengen-type agreement to fight organized crime and illicit trafficking should be considered. In the defense field, Albania signed bilateral co-operation agreements with all countries in the region that include joint training, experience and information exchange, officer visits, drafting legislation assistance, etc.
Institutionalization of regular meetings and consultations in a number of formats including ministers of defense, ministers of foreign affairs, and chiefs of staffs of armed forced seems to be a good practice that needs to be consolidated. Such meetings, unimaginable several years ago, now significantly contribute to improving the overall security climate in the region by increasing mutual understanding and exchanging relevant information and experience.
Although the threat of open conflict has now receded, effective SSR is needed as much as ever, insofar as unreformed security institutions can obstruct the progress of reform, and can in some cases be implicated in the 'new' security threats of organized crime, corruption and trafficking in drugs and human beings. The failure of SSR in one Western Balkans country has direct implications for security in the others. Integrated border management presupposes the cooperation of forces on each side of the border. The fight against organized crime requires a level of cooperation between the police forces of the region that matches the efficiency of cooperation among transnational gangs.
Regional cooperation is a mantra whose rationale is gradually becoming self-evident to the Western Balkan countries. Regional initiatives such as the Adriatic Charter group have significantly improved mutual trust, credibility and interoperability among the three member states. Yet, fostering regional cooperation still remains a must and a started business. Time is now for it to deliver results, and should be filled with more substance.
The Continuation, Support, and Refining of the "Europeanization" of the Balkans: If ever there was a need for an EU-style Marshall Plan for the Balkans, the time is now! And, despite the desire of many states to continue the traditional pattern in which Europe intervenes in the Balkans, often in response to conflict, only to exit as fast as possible in the aftermath of conflict termination, such "tradition" has produced a problematic, often conflictual, history in the region.
Indeed NATO's guidelines and specific targets, reflected in MAP and PARP, were instrumental in ensuring the satisfactory progress of defense sector reform in the Adriatic Charter countries. Similar rigorous planning is needed in other areas of the security sector as well.
NATO and Partner countries: the role of Albania as an aspirant country.
Albania presented the Presentation Document to the Alliance on 22 September 1994. This is an individual document, which represents the areas, size and the level of participation into the cooperative activities with NATO. This document also shows up the steps to be taken by Albania as a partner country to reach the political and military objectives of the Partnership for Peace and make available the means and infrastructure for PfP activities.
Based on the Presentation Document, Albania has prepared the Individual Program of Partnership for Peace (IPP) with NATO. According to this program Albania is committed to have available forces, means, equipment, and necessary capacities for NATO-led peace support operations; to pay the costs of the participation to the PfP activities and cover the expenses of the exercises it can participate. The Alliance on the other side, in order to help partner countries, has adopted a financial policy to assist their participation in PfP program on the partner request. Albania has prepared and implemented the IPP Program with NATO since 1995 and on. Its participation to PfP activities is increased both in quantity and quality over years.
In order to facilitate the implementation of the PfP Program with NATO, Albania is represented by a Diplomatic Mission to NATO HQ in Brussels, which includes its military representation, and a military representative to the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) in Mons, Belgium. Starting from 1 September this year Albania will have a military representative to Allied Command Transformation (ACT) in Norfolk, USA. Also Albania has its representatives as Partner Staff Element at NATO HQs.
The challenges to Euro-Atlantic security are changing. The evolving threats, including terrorism, have domestic and external sources and a transnational nature.
In this environment, the international security structures draw our attention that the international stability and security will increasingly depend on both domestic reforms and wide international co-operation. It means that these two imperatives are inseparable, because effective security co-operation is impossible without building fundamentally democratic institutions in respective countries and increasing the regional and international co-operation.
- What Albania, as an aspirant country, has done to prepare itself for the Membership through implementing the PfP Program?
NATO has applied an opened door policy for its enlargement. The PfP programs and activities are open to all partners. Every partner country has its national objectives and different level of cooperation with NATO in the framework of PfP program. The PfP program gives equal opportunities to all partners to realize their national objectives to join NATO. On the other side, partners themselves have the right to decide which opportunities to pursue and how intensively to work with the Alliance through the Partnership. This is a key element of the self-differentiation process.
Albania through its active participation in Partnership for Peace Program has made efforts and achieved progress in terms of the preparations to join the Alliance. Our active participation in NACC/PfP has provided Albania, as an aspirant country, the framework to establish patterns of political and military cooperation with the Alliance to facilitate a transition to membership.
Through PfP planning, joint exercises and other PfP activities, including seminars, workshops and day-to-day representation in Brussels and Mons, Albania increasingly has become acquainted with the functioning of the Alliance, including policy-making, peacekeeping and crisis management.
The active participation of Albania in Partnership for Peace Program has politically and militarily contributed in its preparation for membership. This participation has helped The Albanian Armed Forces familiarize with the Alliance structures and procedures and deepen their understanding of the obligations and rights that membership will entail.
- How Partnership for Peace Program has contributed to preparing Albania to join the Alliance?
First, the PfP program has helped Albania, as an aspirant country, undertake necessary defense management reforms in order to establish the processes and mechanisms necessary to run a democratically controlled military organization, in areas such as transparent national defense planning, resource allocation and budgeting, appropriate legislation and parliamentary and public accountability. Albania is successfully implementing the reforms not only in the defense sector but also in other crucial sectors of the civilian society.
Second, PfP program has assisted aspirant countries, including Albania, to develop well-established democratic accountability and practices and demonstrate its commitment to internationally-accepted norms of behavior.
Third, within the scope of the Framework Document, PfP has provided a means to promote and develop interoperability with Alliance forces by familiarizing the Albanian Armed Forces with important elements of interoperability. Through the participation to the Operation Capabilities Concept Evaluation & Feedback Program and other relevant activities, Albania has increased its participation in joint exercises with the Alliance, the participation in NATO-led peace support operations and other activities.
Also I would like to stress out that during the implementation of PfP Program both Albania and Alliance have gained from each-other. Albania has given its contribution to the alliance not only by participating in peace support operations but also through organizing NATO/PfP activities in Albania as a host nation. I can mention here the NATO/PfP Exercises Cooperative Engagement 2005, ACT EAPWP Workshop 2006 and more than 6 exercises conducted in the framework of ISOP and Adriatic Charter A-3. There were more than 10 MTTs, seminars, visits and other activities hosted by Albania during two last years. Albania also has hosted one of the most important events in the list of EAPWP activities for 2007, the NATO/PfP Exercises Cooperative LANCER/LONGBOW 2007, including all planning conferences.
Fourth, The Albanian Armed Forces have learned a lot through the implementation of the PfP Planning and Review Process and PfP exercises in terms of familiarizing them with collective defense planning and paving the way for more detailed operational planning. Participation in the PARP process has been for Albania a very effective way to develop its armed forces in order to be able to operate with NATO forces in the longer term. Keeping in mind our strategic objective for joining NATO in near future, Albania has suited its Partnership for Peace Individual Programs (IPP) in order to prepare its armed forces to meet certain minimum standards essential to a functioning and credible Alliance. Also through this individual program Albania has clearly demonstrated its capabilities and commitments from the perspective of a possible NATO membership and to contribute to Alliance missions.
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