NATO's Evolution

Speech to the ATA Council, NATO HQ, 8 May 2007

Ambassador Alessandro Minuto Rizzo

NATO Deputy Secretary General

Ambassador Alessandro Minuto Rizzo NATO Deputy Secretary General

I am delighted to have this opportunity to meet with you.  Over the course of today you have already listened to several NATO PermReps, and you have just received a briefing on NATO's potential role in energy security. Tomorrow, you will get more briefings on global partnerships, on operations, and on NATO's public diplomacy challenges.  So what's left for me to say?
 
I reckon that a good way to start – and to provoke some questions for the Q&A later – would be to offer some personal reflections on NATO's evolution.  Because I believe that looking at how NATO has dealt with change in the past gives us some good pointers about its future.
 
In this respect, I believe that it is instructive to look at NATO's 58-year history as an evolution that proceeded in three distinct phases: the Cold War, the decade that followed the end of the Cold War, and the period that began with the terrorist attacks on Washington and New York on 11 September 2001.  Each of these periods posed very distinct security challenges.  Each required a different set of responses.  And, accordingly, each of these three phases produced a different NATO.
 
Let us very briefly look at the Cold War.  From today's vantage point, that 40-year period may seem like a period of little movement.  Accordingly, one might argue that there was not much need for adaptation.  But that would be getting it wrong.  Even during this first phase of NATO, the transatlantic community displayed a tremendous ability to adapt to changes, and, in some cases, to act itself as an agent of change.  The creation of NATO as an international organisation in the late 1940s and early 1950s was the first indication of change: by turning the commitments of the Washington Treaty into an institution, the Allies created a structure that was – and remains – unique.
 
Of course, there are many other examples of NATO adapting to change during the Cold War.  The evolution of NATO's military strategy, for example, from "massive retaliation" to "flexible response", was a reaction to the changing East-West military balance.  The decision to engage in conventional arms control talks with the Warsaw Pact was a response to hopeful signs of a thawing of the Cold War.  And, last but not least, the Harmel Report was a landmark attempt to re-balance deterrence and détente in a way that was conducive to political progress in East-West relations.
 
So, to cut a long story short, the transatlantic partners were quite capable of adjusting to a changing environment.  But it is fair to say that the rigid political conditions of the Cold War did not allow for too much leeway in terms of shaping policy.  The real challenge only came with the end of the Cold War.  As a transatlantic framework for managing change, NATO became a major factor in Europe's post-Cold War transformation.  Politically, this new role of NATO manifested itself in the policy of enlargement and building partnerships with virtually all countries in the Euro-Atlantic area.  Militarily, NATO's new role was demonstrated most clearly in the Western Balkans.  In trying to stop the violence after the collapse of Yugoslavia, NATO became increasingly involved in crisis management efforts outside its own treaty area.
 
Then came the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001.  They made clear that the major threats to NATO Allies no longer emanated from Europe, as was the case during the Cold War and its immediate aftermath, but from regions outside the "old continent".  In the face of international terrorism, failing states and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, NATO's traditional self-image as a "eurocentric" Alliance became obsolete.
 
In short, "9/11" marked the beginning of the third phase of NATO's evolution.  After protecting Western Europe and then consolidating a unified Europe, the Alliance entered the business of defending against global threats through active engagement.
 
This third phase of NATO's evolution is clearly the most demanding.  Taking the logic of active engagement seriously means that the Alliance now has to cope with an ever broader spectrum of missions, ranging from combat operations to humanitarian relief.
 
Today, with more than 50,000 troops under NATO command, the Alliance is keeping the peace in Kosovo; assisting defence reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina; patrolling the Mediterranean Sea in a naval anti-terrorist mission; engaged in combat as well as peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan; and airlifting African Union troops to the Darfur crisis region in Sudan.  In addition, NATO provided humanitarian relief to Pakistan after the October 2005 earthquake. And NATO is training Iraqi security forces, both inside and outside of the country.
 
Sustaining this broad agenda poses a range of political, military and financial challenges.  Not only are most of NATO's missions and operations today long-term in nature; their ultimate success depends on political and economic development rather than military preponderance.  The duration and complexity of NATO's engagements also raises questions of how to finance these operations in a way that all Allies perceive as fair and equitable.  And, as shown by the fierce fighting in the South and East of Afghanistan, NATO's nations now face the spectre of suffering casualties.  All this is a far cry from the static Cold War Alliance that was able to meet its objectives without any fighting at all.
 
This is all rather demanding, and so, like in the years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, one might wonder whether the Alliance can really absorb so much change.
 
My answer is clear: yes, we can manage.  If we have learned one lesson in these 58 years of NATO, it is that the transatlantic community is remarkably capable of adapting to changing circumstances, and influencing them in a positive direction.  Indeed, the post-"9/11" period has seen the most far-reaching adaptation in NATO's history.
 
We have seen the first invocation of Article 5 – and in the context of an attack by a non-state actor.  We have also seen the first "out-of-continent" mission in Afghanistan.  The creation of the NATO-Russia Council.  A new operational relationship with the EU in Bosnia.  The standing up of the NATO Response Force.  The provision of support for the African Union.  And the creation of new ties with the Gulf countries.  And we achieved much of this, I might add, while we were going through a serious transatlantic and intra-European crisis over Iraq.  Quite obviously, the transatlantic community did not lose its unique ability to cope with change.
 
Indeed, in recent months, we have moved NATO's adaptation even further.  At our Riga Summit, we agreed a new collective financing mechanism for the NATO Response Force.  We are transforming our defence planning system.  We agreed a concept for the coordination of Special Forces.  We are examining NATO's contribution to energy security.  We are enhancing our relationship with Australia, New Zealand, Japan, and South Korea.  We are building new ties with other major players, such as China and Pakistan, and also with India, which I visited just a few weeks ago.  We are enhancing NATO's role as a trainer, notably in the Middle East and the Gulf region.  And we are playing a major role in pushing the international community towards a comprehensive approach for dealing with crisis regions.
 
So what does all this imply for the future of our Alliance?  Three brief reflections.
 
First, we need to enhance political consultation.  The fact that NATO is now engaged on several continents, dealing with diverse countries and cultures, requires a better understanding of the environment in which NATO operates.  In an environment where new security players, such as the European Union, are finding their role, and where other parts of the world are growing in relevance, the transatlantic community can only make real progress if contending ideas are put to the test through informed and frank debate. Moreover, where NATO troops are engaged in an operation, the Alliance must also be part of the process leading to a political solution.  Over time, this "culture of debate" should also be reflected in NATO's Summits and Ministerial meetings, which should become less choreographed and more focused in order to give real political direction.
 
Second, we need to systematically draw lessons from our operational engagements.  Whether we like it or not, NATO has become an Alliance that is defined – and judged – by its performance in operations.  With several such operations now under our belt, we need to make an ever greater effort to translate our operational experiences into concrete political and military improvements.  In many respects, we are already doing so.  For example, we have concluded that defence planning in NATO needs to be more responsive both to present as well as future challenges.  We are revisiting collective solutions, such as multinational logistics and enhanced intelligence sharing, that could offer both financial savings and increased operational effectiveness.  This debate, too, is a result of the concrete operational challenges that we face.
 
Our operational experience has also led us to champion a comprehensive approach of military and civilian actors.  We need to establish proper mechanisms of coordination and cooperation between all the major military and civilian actors in a crisis area, NATO, the UN, the EU, the World Bank, and the NGOs.  Moreover, just as NATO needs to urge the civilian agencies to better understand the military culture and modus operandi, NATO will also have adapt its own operational planning to better support civilian reconstruction and development.
 
Finally, we need to redouble our efforts to bring our publics along.  In my encounters with audiences from both NATO and non-NATO countries I often come across a fundamental lack of understanding about NATO's current roles.  To use my previous example of NATO's three phases, large parts of our publics seem to be stuck somewhere between phases one and two.  In other words, while they have understood that the Cold War is over, they have not yet absorbed all the implications of the post-"9/11" world, including those for NATO.  Too many people still fail to see a connection between NATO's role in Afghanistan and their own personal safety.  For an Alliance like NATO, which is made up of democratic governments, this is a major liability that we must address.
 
Ladies and Gentlemen
Dear Friends,
 
It is clear that in reaching out to our publics, the ATA has a special role to play.  After all, the ATA is the bridge between NATO and our publics.  Over the years, this bridge has been instrumental in helping NATO to be an Alliance that delivers.  That's why I want to take this opportunity to thank you for your support, both through your intellectual input as well as your practical work.  And I want to urge you to keep up the very good work that you are all doing. Thank you.