NATO-EU Cooperation in Operations and Implications for Italy

Leo Michel

Senior Research Fellow, Institute for National Strategic Studies

National Defense University
(2007)

During a March, 2006, workshop at National Defense University, European, Canadian, and U.S. officials and military officers held an animated discussion on the subject of Darfur. Nearly one year earlier, NATO and the EU had received appeals from then UN Secretary General Annan and Chairman of the African Union (AU) Konaré to assist the 7,000 AU monitors in Darfur. However, by late May 2005, widespread media reports spoke of a "beauty contest" between NATO and the EU that threatened to slow down the delivery of needed help. Workshop participants confirmed that key nations and officials within NATO and EU headquarters initially differed substantially on their respective roles in assisting the AU. In the end, however, the participants agreed that the public squabbling was a disservice to all parties, and they expressed relief that relevant military authorities were able to work around the institutional problems, albeit withsome inefficiencies and duplication of efforts. To paraphrase one participant's conclusion: Darfur is an example why NATOand the EU should talk more about what they could do for one another instead of what they cannot.
 
His observation was prescient. To date, NATO has provided airlift for over 16,000 AU troops and police, plus logistical and training support. Furthermore, NATO agreed in December, 2006, to extend its support for another six months. The EU, for its part, has provided airlift for over 2000 personnel, plus training and financial support to the AU effort. Indeed, EU High Representative Solana praised NATO-EU cooperationon Darfur as "very efficient" in remarks to EU Defense Ministers in October, 2006. Still, the security and humanitarian situation in Darfur has deteriorated further in recent months, and the future of the AU operation is unclear. If, however, the UN assumes a peacekeeping role there—possibly as a hybrid force with the AU—it is reasonable to assume that NATO and the EU will be receiving additional requests for logistical, planning, and training assistance.
 
The Darfur case, where there was no model for NATO-EU cooperation, demonstrates that NATO and the EU leadership must adopt pragmatic rather than theological approaches to their cooperation in operations. But it also underscores another point: pragmatism does not mean near-total reliance on ad hoc solutions. Cooperation on advanced planning and capabilities, combined with well-understood and flexible structures for smooth communications, are in the long-term interests of both organizations and their respective member states. The reason for this is clear: experience has shown that it is difficult to predict where, how, and in what political context NATO-EU cooperation might be necessary.
 
A brief look back
 
Consider how NATO first approached possible cooperation with a separate defense organization, the Western European Union (WEU), whose membership also overlapped with thatof the Alliance. At NATO's Berlin Ministerial in June, 1996, NATO agreed to support WEU-led crisis-management operations as part of the development of a "European Security and Defense Identity" within NATO. Before then, NATO andthe WEU had limited experience together— for example, inthe combined Adriatic task force set up in 1992 to enforce the UN arms embargo on the former Yugoslavia. At Berlin, NATOcommitted itself to work out arrangements covering its military planning and exercise support for eventual WEU-led missions, the release of NATO assets and capabilities for such missions, and the provision of headquarters and information-sharing to the WEU. The term of art devised forthis relationship was "separable but not separate" forces, meaning European Allies would continue to develop their capabilities within, not outside, NATO structures, but could undertake operations under WEU leadership. Exactly what kind of WEU-led operations were envisaged was left a bit vague, but most Allies probably had in mind the low-intensity spectrum of Petersberg Tasks; indeed, in 1997 the WEU deployed a police element within a European-led Multinational Protection Force to help restore law and order in Albania.
 
By NATO's April, 1999, Washington Summit, previous assumptions regarding cooperation had changed significantly. The EU in effect had absorbed the WEU, and France and the UK had made their famous St. Malo declaration, which set the stage for the EU's European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP). As a result, the Washington Summit decided to develop the "Berlin Plus" principles to address EU access to NATO operational planning, capabilities and common assets, command options, and adaptation of NATO's defense planning system.In December, 1999, the EU declared its ESDP "Headline Goal"—that is, the ability to deploy some 60,000 military personnel within 60 days and sustain that force for at least one year for the full range of Petersberg Tasks, ranging from humanitarian tasks up to the separation of warring parties. Theoretically, at least, the EU aimed to develop capabilities eventually to handle operations on the scale of Bosnia in1995 or even Kosovo in 1999—either with or without recourse to NATO, depending on the specific circumstances.
 
It is worth recalling that most American defense and military planners—and, I believe, most of their European and Canadian counterparts—assumed in 1999 (and possibly as late as 2002) that NATO and EU military forces and/or other capabilities would not be involved simultaneously in the same mission. Nor were many thinking of how NATO operations might transition to EU leadership.
 
A quick survey of subsequent developments indicates that those assumptions were less than prophetic:
 
– In March 2003, a relatively small NATO crisis management operation in Macedonia, begun in August 2001, transitioned to EU leadership. In this first implementation experience for Berlin Plus, a small NATO headquarters remained in Skopje, including a Senior Civilian Representative and a Senior Military Representative, to assist Macedonian authorities in the development of security sector reform and adaptation to NATO standards.
 
– In December 2004, NATO terminated its 9-year old IFOR/SFOR operation, which had decreased over the years from some 50,000 to 7,000 personnel, and the EU started Operation Althea. This transition also took placewith recourse to Berlin Plus arrangements; as in Macedonia, DSACEUR was named Operational Commander, acting under political guidance and direction of the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC). NATO maintained a modest headquarters in Sarajevo to assist Bosnia-Herzegovina authorities with defense reform, handle certain operational tasks involving counterterrorism and detention of persons indicted for warcrimes, and intelligence coordination with the EU Force.
 
– As noted earlier, NATO and the EU began coordinating efforts in Darfur in mid-2005 without recourse to Berlin Plus arrangements.
 
Looking ahead, new models of NATO-EU cooperation are likely to emerge, beginning with Kosovo. UN Special Envoy Athisaari's has proposed that Kosovo govern itself democratically and be allowed to make international agreements while remaining, at least temporarily, under international supervision. His plan will be considered by the UN Security Council following Athisaari's failure to secure a negotiated agreement between Serbian and Kosovar authorities. While Bosnia-Herzegovina no doubt provides some important "lessons learned," the Bosnian model cannot simply be replicated in the UN protectorate, where some 16,000 NATO-led forces known as Kosovo Force (KFOR) continue to ensure security. However, one option could involve the deployment of a significant ESDP civilian mission of approximately 1,300-1,500 personnel - including police, judges, prosecutors and custom officials - to complement NATO's KFOR during a Kosovo's transition to becoming a sovereign state. If this were to occur, KFOR might shift its emphasis to assistingKosovar authorities in setting up modest defense structures,training a territorial security force, and preparing for membership in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PFP).
 
NATO-EU cooperation in the Balkans has a direct impact on Italian interest, as Italy currently contributes approximately 2,200 personnel to KFOR and nearly 600 to Operation Althea. (The latter figure may decrease over the coming months, as the EU implements its recent decision to reduce the overall force from 6,500 to some 2,500 personnel by late 2007.)
 
Increased NATO-EU cooperation in Afghanistan is likely, as well. NATO took command of the UN-mandated International Security Assistance Force (NATO-ISAF) in August 2003, and the current force of some 37,000 military personnel is expected to grow by several thousand over the coming months. Meanwhile, the EU and its member states have committed to provide Afghanistan some 3.7 billion Euros in development assistance since 2005. In November 2006, the EU Commission approved some 10.6 million Euros to support the delivery of services and improved governance under the NATO-led Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) in regions outside Kabul. In addition, the EU Council's General Secretariat is planning a possible ESDP police mission to Afghanistan, comprised of some 160 personnel, beginning in June 2007. As the EU's profile increases, it will require close coordination with NATO-ISAF, for example, on security and logistical arrangements for EU personnel and programs. This will be especially true as part of the ESDP police deployment will be working within the PRTs.
 
As in the Balkans, Italian interest in NATO-EU cooperation in Afghanistan should be self-evident, given the presence of some 2000 Italian troops in NATO-ISAF (Italy currently leads Regional Command West) and Italy's leadership role, under the "Bonn Process" launched in late 2001, in assisting Afghanistan to reform its judicial system.
 
Pillars for future cooperation
 
Looking at the range of operations where NATO and the EU are, or might be, involved, one sees four broad challenges for their intensified cooperation.
 
First, both organizations need to pay attention to the practical prerequisites for success. These include working to ensure that their military capabilities are mutually reinforcing, that their procedures are very much in tune, if not identical, and that their training is coherent.
Like Italy, each of the other 20 EU member states that also belongs to
NATO has one set of military forces and, equally important, one defense budget; these must serve national missions as well as those
that might become obligated under NATO, EU, UN or "coalition of the willing" leadership5. Given the current and projected state of Italy's defense budget and that of its European partners, as well as the constant and growing demand for European forces to serve in crisis
management or peacekeeping operations, there is no room for wasteful and unnecessary duplication. And when it comes to doctrine, training, and equipment interoperability, European military commanders understand that inconsistent practices could increase the inherent risk of military operations.
 
Fortunately, there is some encouraging news here. For example, most EU nations, including PFP members Sweden and Finland, have expressed their commitment to follow NATO standards in certifying their forces for the EU's rapid reaction capability known as "battlegroups." But there is troubling news, too. Effective NATO-EU cooperation on capabilities development, according to several informed accounts, is still lagging. A formal NATO-EU Capability Group has existed for some time, but has become a rather sterile forum. Some nations unfortunately have blocked the formation of subgroups of technical experts who could actually coordinate on, or propose joint solutions to, specific capabilities development tasks. More is at stake here than just bureaucratic squabbles. For example, NATO's "Defense Against Terrorism" initiatives, such as countering improvised explosive devices and protecting helicopters against rocket-propelled grenades, could usefully be shared with the EU. Why? Because such weapons threaten European as well as U.S. and
Canadian forces in Afghanistan and could appear in other regions where EU operations might occur. Similarly, a regular exchange of operational "lessons learned" between NATO and EU military staffs would be beneficial to a number of member states of both organizations.
 
Second, both organizations need to cooperate better in planning and integrating the application of civilian and military capabilities to deal with the complex crisis management and stabilization operations that we face today and certainly will continue to face in the future. Recent declarations by some European leaders to the effect that NATO is and must remain an exclusively "military organization" are off the mark. Indeed, they do not conform to the more complex reality of how NATO operations have been conducted in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Afghanistan. In truth, there is little appetite among NATO members, including the United States, to transform NATO into a civilian relief or reconstruction agency. Yet it seems self-evident that if those who provide security and those who provide development and governance assistance are not working together, neither will succeed. In a positive move, the November 2006 Riga Summit Declaration recognized this problem, albeit in very diplomatic phraseology. It remains to be seen if the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which has now been charged by heads of state and government to come up with pragmatic proposals by next spring on improving the civil-military interface, will really get the support it needs from all the key nations.
 
In this context, two additional observations seem relevant. In candid moments, some knowledgeable Europeans allow that cooperation within EU structures – in particular, between the Council Secretariat and the Commission – has been at least as problematic as NATO-EU links. If the EU is able to work out better relations between the Council and Commission to deal with the future ESDP civilian mission in Kosovo, this presumably would translate into a more effective EU effort and better NATO-EU cooperation in Afghanistan. But Kosovo also could create another precedent, as one sees signs of U.S. interest in participating in the prospective ESDP civilian mission. Washington understandably would be very attentive to the security needs of American personnel attached to an ESDP mission and, therefore, seek clearly defined authorities and procedures for the NATO commander to act, if necessary, to safeguard those personnel. Reliance on ad hoc arrangements between NATO and the EU in this sensitive area clearly would not suffice.
 
A third challenge is to develop meaningful NATO-EU political consultations to deal with the broad and pressing agenda that faces both organizations. In a January 2007 speech in Berlin, NATO Secretary General de Hoop Scheffer vented his frustration over the inadequacies of the NATO-EU strategic dialogue, which some have compared to the "frozen conflicts" of the Caucasus region. Due to the political blockages restricting the NAC-PSC formal agenda, informal sessions likely will be the best vehicle for such consultations for some time to come. Still, the current practice of holding "at 32" discussions should not be limited to occasional lunches and dinners among foreign ministers of NATO and EU member states. Consultations among NATO and EU member states and the top leadership of each organization should take place more frequently and involve many other levels, too. By now, the meaning and importance of military interoperability – including doctrine, planning, technology, equipment, and training – are well understood. Such interoperability does not imply abandonment of sovereignty; it will always be up to political authorities to decide if military forces will be committed in a specific instance. But interoperability is an essential pre-condition to cooperate effectively if a political decision is made to do so. A mature NATO-EU relationship will need to accept, at least implicitly, the notion of political interoperability.
 
Consider this modest proposal: As a potential crisis develops, senior representatives of member states of NATO and EU, plus the NATO Secretary General and EU High Representative and senior military representatives of both organizations, should gather – if need be, on "informal" basis – for a tour de table to air and discuss initial assessments and hear from each other what capabilities might be available to formulate a comprehensive crisis management response. The member state representatives would then take information back to capitals to deliberate on an appropriate response. The initial NATOEU meeting would not be "joint decision making" – everyone understands that both organizations will want to maintain autonomous decision making – but it would serve the purpose of getting key parties to put their cards on the table, allowing all member states and NATO and EU officials to make better informed decisions. Some NATO-EU tensions likely are inevitable, as the organizations are different and national political calculations will come into play in any specific case. But with better tools in place to cooperate, the chances of an effective response will increase if and when the political will exists to do so.
 
A fourth challenge is to accept that operational surprises canoccur, and that military and political transparency regarding ongoing and potential future operations is a requirement, not a luxury. Even when the EU undertakes an "autonomous" mission – that is, without recourse to Berlin Plus – greater transparency with regard to the planning and conduct of such missions would be prudent. After all, a notional 1,500-person EU "battlegroup" might include approximately 450 "trigger pullers" in its combat element, of whom some 150 might be tactically deployed – i.e., "on the street" – at any time. If European forces engaged in an ESDP operation were to encounter unforeseen circumstances, especially if those forces were put at serious risk, it is reasonable to assume that their longstanding Allies would be inclined to help.
 
Similarly, the problems with "caveats" experienced in NATO operations could serve as a harbinger of similar issues in EU operations; indeed, according to some reports, the recent ESDP operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo was obliged to cope with restrictions that, in NATO parlance, amount to "caveats". NATO military leaders – both European and North American – have made clear their concerns with the effects of caveats. But so, too, has the new Chairman of the EU Military Committee, General Bentegeat of France, who told the NATO Parliamentary Assembly meeting in Paris in May 2006: "The many caveats imposed by nations hobble commanders on the ground and increase the risk to their forces".
 
In sum, NATO and the EU likely will be joined at the hip in a range of future operations. The practical result of their overlapping interests is that neither organization can afford to fail, or afford to see the other fail, in operations. If this is not sufficient incentive to get serious about effective cooperation between the two, the oft-used rhetorical references to their "strategic partnership" will ring hollow and all of their member states – Italy included – will be the worse for it.
 
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The author's views do not necessarily represent the official policy of the Department of Defense or any other U.S. Government agency.