The Role of NATO in the Stabilization of Afghanistan

Amb. Musa M. Maroofi

Ambassador of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan to Italy

University of Trieste, Gorizia Pole, 21 April 2009

I. The Initial Phase

Naturally, the first question that comes to mind regarding the presence of NATO forces in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is the issue of legitimacy. In retrospective, in late 2001, the Security Council authorized the United States to overthrow the Taliban government, as well as its ally the terrorist al-Qaeda organization. The Council also authorized the US and its NATO allies to set up the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) to provide military support for a newly established pro-democracy government (meanwhile the United States continued to run a separate anti-terrorist military operation). In March 2002, the Council established the United Nations Assistance Mission for Afghanistan (UNAMA) to manage all UN humanitarian, relief, recovery and reconstruction activities.
 
These decisions by the Security Council were taken at a time when the national security forces of Afghanistan, including the military, the police and intelligence either were ruined or had disappeared with the disappearance of the communist regime, the disunity of the ruling mujahideen, and subsequently the collapse of the Taliban's government.
 

• The Taliban and Al-Qaeda were expelled from Afghanistan.
• The control of the central government was expanded to even the remotest areas of the country.
• The ground was prepared for the introduction of a democratic and progressive Constitution, fair and transparent presidential, parliamentary and provincial elections.
• For its part, the new Constitution guaranteed freedom of speech and associations, which paved the way for the emergence of printed and electronic free media, as well political parties, hundreds of professional associations by men and women. The free market economy replaced the old-fashioned state controlled economic system, resulting in a surge by foreign and domestic private entrepreneurs in the broadcasting, telecommunication, banking, mining and other sectors. Political stability also helped the government to rebuild the educational, academic and cultural institutions of the country with so much focus on opening the doors of schools for six million children, girls and boys, building hospitals and clinics, restoring damaged museums and historical monuments. The rebuilding of the country included agriculture, infrastructure and rural areas, and much more.

However, while the progress in terms of the rebuilding of the country continued, progress in the war against terrorism began to show some signs of weakness vis-à-vis the resurgence of the Taliban and Al-Qaeda strength around 2006.
 
In a letter to the Security Council, dated February 4, 2008, NATO Secretary-General Japp de Hoop Scheffer, while admitting that the Afghan Army and Police forces were inadequately trained, painted a depressing picture of the security situation in Afghanistan. Several NATO countries expressed concern about reports that indicated that the Taliban enjoyed an upsurge of military success in 2007-2008.
 
Subsequently, a number of reasons were found responsible for this situation. I will mention just a few:

1. Inadequate number of troops
    
   
   The Bucharest meeting addressed this issue, which resulted in more NATO troops in Afghanistan than in 2005.
   
   Nevertheless, there was a growing resignation to the fact that some of the presidents and prime ministers, who attended an alliance summit in Bucharest (2-4 April 2008), were unable or unwilling to send more troops to Afghanistan. Vice President Biden complained that the United States would expect more from Europe. Then, as was expected, the leaders of European allies in NATO's 60th anniversary on April 4, 2009, agreed to provide up to 5,000 new troops with 3,000 of them deployable only temporarily to provide security for the August elections in Afghanistan. For his part, President Obama declared, following his new strategy, increasing the number of American troops this year to about 68,000 from the current 38,000. The new strategy seems aiming at creating larger and better–trained forces that can defend the country. A further 1,400 to 2,000 soldiers will be sent to form embedded training teams for the Afghan Army and the police.
   
    
2. Sharing burden
    
   
   Presently, a two-tier structure seems to be enshrined in NATO: active, combative members, such as the USA, UK, Canada and Holland - vs. passive members confined to roles of logistical support. Perhaps, such members feel that they might not have adequate support from their own constituents. This observation naturally leads us to the issue of enhancing adequate public awareness. The man in the street in NATO nations needs to know that if the war is not won in Afghanistan, then they should be prepared to fight it in their own cities and streets.
    
3. NATO's doubts about its own performance
    
   NATO must speak with one voice, maintain its unity and make the enemy know it. Originally created for a European theater, and following its victories in Eastern as well as Central Europe, since 2001, it has achieved a great deal on an Asian theater. It can certainly achieve final victory if it maintains its traditional winning spirit.
   However, it is necessary to bear in mind the fact the war against terrorism is very different from the conventional wars, or a nuclear offence, for which NATO seemed to have had enough professional preparedness. The war of terrorism has its own rules: an invisible attacker on a borderless theater undisturbed by means, time and identity of the victims.
    
   
4. Inadequate calculation
    
   In 2001, the Taliban and Al-Qaeda were expelled, but not eliminated. However, their ostensible disappearance was mistaken for a sign of their elimination. Unfortunately, the constant warnings of the Afghan government were not heeded as seriously as it should have been. In essence, Al-Qaeda was making vigorous preparations on the soil of Pakistan to destabilize not only Afghanistan but also Pakistan. As a part of its long-term strategy, parallel to expanding terrorist attacks, Al-Qaeda was able to Talibanize terrorism. It was also able to help the Taliban to Tribalize terrorism by manipulating two most fundamental pillars of the Afghan and Pakistani societies in the tribal areas, i.e., Religion and Ethnicity. A report by the International Herald Tribune even indicates to Al-Qaeda and Taliban adding "class war" to the two pillars.
    
   The change in the enemy's equation, naturally, makes it necessary for NATO and Allies to add 'peoples force' to the national and international forces, which in addition to enhancing the military strength will provide jobs and income for many in the rural areas. However, extreme caution is necessary to prevent the creation of an independent militia force that could threaten law and order in the long term.

III. Conclusions

There is no alternative to putting terrorism out of business. This conflict is winnable. However, there is need for more emphasis on building and expanding the defense capacity of the Afghan national forces, which seem to be definitely in need of more money and more soldiers, as well as training, weapons and military equipment.
 
Afghanistan needs peace and stability as well as regional and international cooperation for its development. It also needs more cooperation in rebuilding her educational, medical, judicial and financial institutions at a time when additional challenges such as global financial crisis, food security and climate change compete for more attention. As far as further consolidation of peace and security in Afghanistan are concerned, NATO's role is particularly crucial now that its operations include an election operation that is working with Afghan authorities to register voters and organize elections for 2009 and 2010.
 
As far as Al-Qaeda is concerned, evidence proves that the theater of operation goes beyond the Afghan border, and that the Al-Qaeda's ultimate agenda seems much more extensive than what was initially estimated. Thus in practical terms, NATO now has an even larger task on its hands than in 2001.
 
However, NATO in its military operations should keep in mind local sensitivities as well as the safety of civilians in order to win the peoples minds and hearts. Gaining the peoples' trust is as crucial as the military power itself.