NATO's Partnerships Put to the Test in the Greater Middle East

As history unfolds across the greater Middle East, the Atlantic Alliance is facing the second wave of liberty in its history after the fall of communism and the Soviet Union. Similarly, it is not a disinterested spectator. Since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, the area has become of vital interest for the security of NATO member states and the whole international community. In addition, many of the countries being experiencing internal uprisings are NATO partners in the frameworks of the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) and Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI).

Therefore, the Alliance is monitoring with due care the current events in North Africa, the Middle East and the Gulf as well as South-West Asia. Nobody knows what outcomes will take shape from such a turmoil and uncertainty is further raising the alarm around the major security threats whose the greater Middle East is a primary source: terrorism, political and religious extremism, weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles proliferation. Not to mention that the stabilization of Afghanistan seems to be still trapped in a deadlock and NATO enduring commitment in the country is challenging the political cohesion of the Alliance and the Transatlantic link.

While expressing his concern about the possible fallouts of the ongoing situation, Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, has been straightforward in backing up the legitimate aspirations to freedom of Arab and Muslims populations. Commenting on the protests in Egypt, he immediately called for “a peaceful transition to democracy” and “respect for minorities, human rights and the rule of law.” “These are the principles on which our Alliance is based. These are also the principles we hope will be respected by countries participating in our partnership,” he stated. In fact, Egypt is one of the NATO seven partners in the MD, even including Algeria, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. Except for Israel, these countries are experiencing domestic unrests, albeit hitherto with different degrees of intensity and developments. In the same vein, ICI countries like Bahrain and Kuwait are being affected by clashes and we will find out whether Qatar and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) will remain immune to any turbulence. All that is likely to have an impact on NATO partnerships in the Greater Middle East.

The MD was born in 1994 and evolved into a genuine partnership at the Istanbul Summit in June 2004. During this Summit, NATO Heads of State and Government inaugurated the ICI, gathering those Gulf Cooperation Council members disposed to reach out to NATO. Both the initiatives are devised to strengthen regional security and stability through dialogue and practical cooperation. As for the MD, NATO has proposed to all partners an increasing range of activities (tools) at a bilateral level, with regard to counter-terrorism, anti-proliferation, information exchange, joint exercises, training, civil-military cooperation, drug trafficking, public diplomacy and civil emergency planning. In a spirit of joined ownership, the cooperation programs are tailored to the specific needs and distinctiveness of each partner and aim to favor interoperability. In particular, to stand out is the privileged partnership with Israel, the first MD country to sign an Individual Cooperation Program, which is the agreement outlining the targeted fields of cooperation with NATO.

Cooperation in crisis management between NATO and the MD partners has also a positive record. Morocco, Egypt and Jordan participated to NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, Morocco and Israel are playing a role in the antiterrorist Operation Active Endeavour patrolling the Mediterranean Sea, and Jordan has deployed troops in Afghanistan to support NATO-ISAF mission with training and reconstruction tasks. Unlike the ICI, the MD provides a multilateral format designed to stimulate talks among the seven countries of the southern shore of the Mediterranean Sea. Up to now, numerous conferences, programs and relevant initiatives have been organized under the MD umbrella. Meetings at a level of the Ministers of Defense and Foreign Affairs as well as Joint Chiefs of Staff have been held since 2004, when the MD achieved the partnership status. However, no real multilateral cooperation on security and defense issues is underway among the Mediterranean partners. So far, mutual distrust and long-standing misconceptions have refrained them from establishing a constructive interaction, although the different geographical specificities of countries from Maghreb and Mashrek have not favored talks either. On the other hand, in consideration of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, to gather all the MD countries around the same table can be considered a valuable starting point for the promotion of "cooperative security" in the area.

As for the ICI, to date important agreements have been signed on information protection and sharing, but the amount of practical bilateral activities is far below the MD record, despite the wide menu of tools provided by NATO in the same sectors. This is mainly due to the low profile approach the GCC members have adopted toward NATO. The history, function and aims of the Alliance are still often erroneously perceived across the region and that may have influenced Gulf countries’ attitude, even if they have a strong need for the kind of cooperation that NATO is willing and able to set up. For instance, Saudi Arabia and Oman have chosen not to enter the ICI yet, whereas the GCC appointed a representative to the EU in Brussels but not to NATO. As a consequence, the bilateral cooperation in the ICI is not as developed as it could be if more energies and resources were committed by partner countries. Against this backdrop, the UAE can be considered an exception, as they have established a deeper security cooperation with the Alliance and sent troops alongside NATO in Afghanistan and the Balkans, that is well beyond the Gulf area.

Concerning the multilateral dimension, the ICI lacks of a structured forum for dialogue among partners, as a reflection of the hurdles hampering cooperation within the GCC itself. Then, the role of the NATO public diplomacy is being crucial to foster talks and interchange at multilateral other than bilateral level, even encompassing the GCC countries not involved in the ICI. Joint events and initiatives are steadily increasing in number and Secretary General Rasmussen and his Deputy, Ambassador Claudio Bisogniero, are personally committed to support dialogue and friendly relationships in the region, thereby encouraging NATO partners and interlocutors to boost their ties with the Alliance.

At the beginning of his tenure in August 2009, Secretary General Rasmussen indicated the revitalization of efforts to deepen and streamline dialogue and cooperation in the MD and ICI frameworks as one of his priorities in office. Afterwards, this stance became the official policy of the Alliance in Lisbon, where the new NATO Strategic Concept was adopted last November, advocating an “active engagement” with global partners.

As a sign of the growing political relevance of the MD and ICI, the NATO Strategic Concept has also assured that the Alliance “will be open to consultation with any partner country on security issues of common concern,” which is a right that the 1999 Strategic Concept simply recognized to the Partnership for Peace countries. Actually, both the MD and ICI partners, as well as the rest of the GCC members, were already consulted during the process of elaboration of the new NATO Strategic Concept by the North Atlantic Council and the Group of Experts chaired by Madeleine K. Albright. In this wake, Rasmussen announced that NATO is ready to equalize the MD and ICI partners to the Euro-Atlantic ones, by raising up the number of tools at their disposal to more than 1.600, the same amount offered to the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council members.

In light of all this, the Alliance has laid the groundwork for a strategic relaunch of the MD and ICI. Nevertheless, the future of these strategic partnerships seems now to be hanging by the dynamics currently agitating the Greater Middle East. Much will be dependent on the conduct of the governments caught up in the demonstrations. NATO put on hold relations with Mauritania due to the military coup on August 2009 and resumed it only after elections were held. This could constitute a significant precedent and something similar could be happening at short notice again. Or harsher measures could be taken whether a partner should resort to the extreme measures carried out by Libya against the protestors.

The ongoing events could also empower governments which are less friendly or hostile to NATO and will not respect the bilateral agreements in the security field. Should it be the case, the continuation of partnership relations cannot but be questioned and the resulting void of interlocutors would put at serious stake the whole course of the MD and ICI. In addition, aggressive forces could take advantage of the instability in the area and the weakness of local governments to further their threatening ambitions. To that effect, the decision of the Egyptian provisional authorities to allow the passage of two Iranian warships through the Suez Canal seems not to be in line neither with the traditional Egyptian policy nor with the security arrangements relevant to the NATO maritime operations Active Endeavor and Ocean Shield, the latter engaged in combating piracy off the cost of the Horn of Africa.

On the other hand, such a volatile scenario holds “a great potential for positive, democratic change”, as Secretary General Rasmussen pointed out speaking at the recent 11^th Herzlyia Conference in Israel. On this occasion, by acknowledging “the need to address the demand of Arab societies for democratic reforms”, he reminded the Alliance what goals should be pursued in the Greater Middle East for the sake of the MD and ICI and the long-term security and stability of the Euro-Atlantic community. Then, turning to the NATO Mediterranean partners, and implicitly to those of the ICI, he also highlighted three requirements to meet for a better common future: 1) define our common threats and challenges; 2) finding common solutions; 3) understanding that we share a common destiny.

Along these lines, conditions could be created for the raise of a regional security compact tackling the common threats to peace and stability in the Greater Middle East and the Euro-Atlantic community in conjunction with NATO. The door of this security compact would remain open to new partners around the region, starting with Iraq, where NATO Training Mission continues to perform a crucial role, and Afghanistan, which has signed an Enduring Partnership with the Alliance. “Nuclear proliferation, ballistic missile proliferation or terrorism constitute problems for the Middle East and for us all,” Rasmussen warned, and the NATO “decision to develop a Missile Defense Capability” provides a further major ground for cooperation with the MD and ICI partners. Hence, common solutions for common threats and again the hope for a common destiny based on freedom and democracy for the Arab-Muslim world and the West.

In seeking these objectives, one of the main obstacles to overcome remains the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. As the Secretary General put it, this dispute “may no longer be perceived as the only problem in the region, but it still constitutes a major impediment in addressing other issues that threaten regional stability.” Therefore, he urged Israel and the Palestinians to restart negotiations, confirming the Alliance availability to deploy a peace-keeping mission if a comprehensive peace agreement will be reached, if requested by both the parties and if the UN give the green light to a NATO possible intervention. Such a scenario is unlikely to occur at once. Yet, this rising new wave in the Greater Middle East can eventually lead to more promising circumstances for a peace settlement between Israel and the Palestinians as well as for NATO partnerships.

(Longitude - The Italian Monthly of Foreign Affairs, n. 2)

Emiliano Stornelli is a Researcher on Foreign Policy and Security issues at the Italian Atlantic Committee.