NATO Military Contribution to Peace: An Evolving Role

Adm. Ferdinando Sanfelice di Monteforte

Italian Military Representative to the NATO and EU Military Committees

Rome, Center for High Defense Studies, 27th September 2006

 

In a forum intended for tomorrow's leaders and concentrating its proceedings on the future of Euro-Atlantic Security, it is at least proper for me to highlight which kind of approach is followed, within the NATO Military environment, in order to conceive and prepare adequate forces for the future challenges.
 
Let's say, right now, that we are in the very initial step of a process which may eventually lead to a profound revision of the present NATO Strategic Concept, whose foundations are showing some minor, albeit indicative cracks, even if, by and large, it is to be considered still sound and applicable. 
Actually, this document was really forward-looking, when it was agreed in the year 2000, and this goes very much to the credit of those who prepared it. As you may recall, the concept is based on a triad of activities, namely: Article 5, Crisis Response and Consultation & Cooperation. 
This triad reflected, in fact, the experience gained by NATO during the previous seven years, mostly during the crisis in Former Yugoslavia. NATO involvement, it is fair to say, came out more as a last minute trouble-solving attempt, in order to contain the increasingly violent civil war in that unfortunate area, than as a deliberate application of a collective political will, formulated well in advance. 
In fact, until this involvement materialized, the loss of its chief "raison d'?tre", namely the defence against a possible invasion from the East, had placed NATO in the embarrassing position of finding itself almost jobless. 
In this occasion, NATO showed two main features, making it extremely appealing to the International Community, in a world undergoing a transition toward a then unknown direction. These features were, first of all, a strong "civilian control of the military", thanks to the rule of consensus, something which may be better depicted as the "rule of dissent". It is, in fact, sufficient the veto from one small Member State to stop the endorsement of any NATO action. 
You know well how much this issue has been debated, in other multinational fora, where different conclusions were reached. From the purely military standpoint, though, the rule of dissent is a sound sanity check for any operational plan, which has the advantage of preventing a lot of mistakes, even if this sometimes goes at the expenses of but a few bright ideas and brilliant schemes. 
The second key feature displayed by NATO was a well organized and militarily sound chain of command, able to direct crisis response operations at all levels with good results.
I was possible, though, to object – and, indeed, it has been done time and again – that the "new NATO" had become a military giant and a political dwarf, as it mostly acted on the basis of external outputs, first of all from the United Nations. 
Indeed, during this period UN officials offered NATO several times to establish a structured link between both organisations, with NATO acting as the military agent of the UN, but no consensus has been reached, in the Alliance, for such an unusual from of relationship, due to the obvious political pitfalls.
 
Shortly thereafter, though, the tragedy of 9/11 started to re-shuffle all cards, and by undertaking the military role of anti-terrorism, in support of the United States, NATO applied Article 5 of the Treaty, precisely in the opposite direction, as compared to its original aim, which was the defence of Europe with US support. Operation Active Endeavour, namely the application of silent pressure at sea, is therefore something more revolutionary than it appears at first glance. 
A lot, though, has still perfectly fallen, since then, within the key directives laid down in the Strategic Concept. Conflict prevention in FYROM-Macedonia, the multi faceted crisis response in Kosovo, the ongoing peace implementation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, event the stabilisation of Northern and Western Afghanistan are perfect examples of operations easily fitting within the Concept's purviews. 
Also the intense and ever-growing activity of Consultation and Cooperation, where Partnership for Peace was supplemented by the Mediterranean Dialogue, the special relationship established with Russia and Ukraine and later by the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative, showed how important this strand of the Strategic Concept was and still is nowadays.
 
More recently, though, NATO, has started doing something new, first of all by establishing the NATO Response Force. Its main role, Initial Entry in a particularly troubled area, is quite indicative of an indirect acknowledgment that times have changed, during the most recent years. 
The NRF, to use its acronym, is in fact a powerful instrument, with a relatively limited land component, something which may appear disproportionate, as compared to a classic peace-keeping scenario. Why? 
There are not anymore only risks, instability, and failed states. There is also, somewhere, someone who hates us and is ready and eager to put his own and others' life at stake to kill our people and damage our Nations' vital interests. 
Mind you, I am not referring to single individuals or small organisations only. Try to consider the amount of explosive used, in the last few years, to carry out asymmetric attacks, both within our Continent and outside, and you will note that behind these relatively few idealist there is a well-lubricated logistic chain, a relevant planning capability and a profound strategic thinking going on even at this very moment, otherwise all this conundrum would not have been possible. 
Therefore, in pursuance of the Western attempts to defuse crises, to prevent humanitarian tragedies, to stabilize and re-construct troubled areas and failed states, NATO has reached the conclusion that it may face a strong opposition, at least in the areas of crisis.
This potential opposition implies more capabilities by NATO, in order to deter and contain it; that's why NRF has been conceived. Incidentally, it is worth noting that also the European Union, by agreeing to establish the EU Battle Groups, is following the same line of thought. 
Many of you may have seen, recently, how the initial echelon of the forces, belonging to some European Nations, have entered Southern Lebanon; some of you have also noted that these landings took place in an apparently peaceful environment. It is worth reminding, though, that these forces were showing a capability to react forcefully, in case of opposition, and this visible force, much like the umbrella in your car, has performed a deterrent role, thus enhancing the security of the troops on the terrain.
 
We must acknowledge, therefore, the second small crack in the foundations of the NATO Strategic Concept. The nice and tidy era of low-risk peacekeeping is over for good. Our Nations cannot take any more as a given that our soldiers will reach the troubled areas by a transport plane or a passenger ferry, to be received by pretty girls throwing flowers and laying red carpets. This radical change of scenario calls for expeditionary capabilities, more than simple deployability; indeed, any boot on the ground, under some circumstances, may become a potential hostage, apart from being bound to be involved in a long, wearisome war of attrition. 
The strategies of limited aim, so much advocated by Liddell Hart, and practiced at the very beginning of NATO real world operations – namely Operations Deny Flight and Sharp Guard – are therefore acquiring renewed relevance. 
A more significant rationale, though, exists for "such a policy, (which) has more support from history than military opinion hitherto has recognized" (1). 
The chief reason is that the Western Nations are inherently unable and unwilling to indefinitely respond in kind to an escalation of violence carried out without limits, up to extreme cruelty. 
Nothing new. Already the good old Carl von Clausewitz had warned us on this issue, when he said "in most cases a policy of maximum exertion would fail because of the domestic problems it would raise" (2). 
This is also due to the fact that nobody is strong and cohesive enough to crack any nut with his big hammer, and the Vietnam war is the most illuminating instance of such a truth. Forces designed for high intensity warfare are not any more the only tool required to our Nations. The so –called "high-low mix" is now a real operational need.
 
How NATO is acknowledging these novelties? The first, significant step has been made through the recent Political Guidance, which envisages the requirement to cope with the full range of possible operations, and singles out the need to focus mainly on those which are the "most likely" ones, instead of limiting the scenarios to the "most intense" operations. 
NATO, in short, is well dug into the realm of the "art of possible", being fully aware that there are many available options, besides the use of unrestricted and overwhelming force.
There is, however, another set of initiatives I would like to bring to your kind attention. Both NATO and EU have started looking at a longer term perspective, to be used as the polar star for the build-up of their military instruments. 
The work has just started, but it gives you already a good indication how the uneasiness about our present force posture is growing. 
In an increasingly multi-polar world, with States and Entities gaining relevance, day after day, both Organisations feel the need to re-module their force planning process, in accordance with the most probable requirements dictated by the situation. 
This revision process, still in its infancy, requires fresh approaches, young participants and a solid cultural background. We need to understand that the forces we have today, still basically stemming from the air-land posture of the Cold War era, may not be the best response to the emergencies of tomorrow. 
For this reason, the scene is set for another NATO Strategic Concept, whose formulation will require some years of clear political analysis, sound strategic thinking, and patient but steady implementation, not withstanding the vested interests which are opposing change, as usual in these circumstances. 
As tomorrow's leaders, you have the moral duty to be prepared to follow first and then direct this complicated process. The future of Euro-Atlantic security is in your hands. 
Keep your minds open, increase your strategic culture, do not let yourselves be led astray by irrationality – be it your feelings or your political passions – as you cannot afford to fail.
Remember what Mahan said: "even failing a court-martial, defeat cries aloud for explanation; whereas success, like charity, covers a multitude of sins" (3). 
Good luck and welcome to this forum!
 
___________________________
(1) B. Liddel Hart - "Strategy" - Praeger, N.Y. 1955, pg. 334
(2) C. von Clausewitz - "On War" - Princeton Univ. Press 1976, pg. 585
(3) A.T. Mahan - "Naval Strategy" - Sampson, Low etc., N.Y. 1911, pg. 384

 

 
 
 

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