Italy and the Western Balkans

The geography of the Italian peninsula is such that “the sea surrounds it on three sides, (while) to the north (it) is separated from the rest of Europe by the highest mountains of the continent”, to use the words of a former Italian Prime Minister, Vittorio Emanuele Orlando. In fact, while the Adriatic sea is long and narrow, thus facilitating contacts and intercourses between the opposite shores, since the age of oar, there are relatively few mountain passes on the Alps, all easy to control, in case of war. Only the easternmost part of this mountain chain has lower peaks, being a sort of hilly region, where eastbound and westbound mass migrations could easily take place: they became significant already toward the end of the Roman Empire and have never stopped since.

These two features have favored, throughout the centuries, close contacts with our neighbors of the Western Balkans, as well as allowing mixed settlements of groups from both ethnicities in all parts of that region, on either side of these hills; many Italian sea traders, too, went farther and built villages and towns along the Dalmatian coast, where their relatives and their successors have lived for the following centuries.

But how the Balkans are seen in Italy? We know that they have been for five centuries the land front of a series of north- south wars without limits on land and at sea, first among Christian sovereigns and local potentates and later between the major Christian powers, in support of Austria, and the Armies of the Ottoman Empire.

The relationship between these two types of struggle is typical, as internecine struggles create a “power vacuum” which attracts big powers, and the Italian history is but another instance of this deadly sequence of events, as the plain of the Po has been for centuries one among the preferred battlefields of European powers.

Since the outset in the Balkans, each time a war ended and peace was sought between the warring powers, both of them built in a hurry a number of fortified towns all along the new border, populating them with loyal people. All these comings and goings in this long struggle resulted therefore in a piecemeal distribution of these settlements, often in the middle of provinces where communities of the other ethnicity lived.

As a consequence, the demographic map of the region acquired a configuration most similar to a leopard skin. Also, Austria, whose possessions on the Italian side of the Alps became significant in 1797, was instrumental to encourage this mix of populations, very much in accordance with its multi-ethnic philosophy.

The net outcome of the interaction among all these factors is the practical impossibility to separate ethnicities, without violating the most elementary human rights, both in northeastern Italy and in the Balkans as a whole.

But the thorniest problem of all these struggles is that they have left, among the populations concerned, a widespread hatred toward those who took sides against them; this kind of feeling lasts for centuries, being handed down from father to son. Collective memory, though, is extremely selective, as populations keep in mind the hardships they have endured, not those they have inflicted upon others! This is precisely most serious problem of the region: to use Churchill words, “the Balkans produce more history than they are able to consume”.

This situation made increasingly difficult any mutual friendship between the populations involved, including the Italian ethnicity, even if the rationale for cooperation between Italy and the people in the Balkans was – and still is – always so great that a prominent Croat, Ante Trumbic – major of Split in 1905 – said “between us and Italy there is no real dissent, only misunderstandings”. And this, in fact, should always be the worst case!

There were, though, also many occasions of dispute, and my account will describe both “the ups” and “the downs” in this relationship. It is also fair to say that both sides misbehaved from time to time: especially when the balance of power was uneven, the strongest component was tempted to try dominating the other, and the latter always reacted sharply, going sometimes beyond what is considered to be the usual domain of self preservation. This overreaction sparked further measures, and so this situation went on for decades, each time.

Venice had done precisely this, throughout its existence as an independent republic, and the Dalmatians recurred to piracy, in order to contain and undermine Venetian power, apart from finding in this kind of activity a way to live better: the pirates of Senj, in the Kvarner gulf, were only one instance of this action – reaction spiral.

Once Italy, after having been for centuries only a geographic expression, was eventually unified, her leaders were wisely interested in keeping good relations with all Slavs, especially with Serbians: both our populations had fought, during the XIX century to gain freedom, and had reached independence against a lot of odds and powerful oppositions. Also many exiles from the Balkans had found refuge in Italy and vice versa.

In short, there were strong reasons to keep this friendship in the coming years, as both nations had undergone the same bitter experiences and also because they were too small to compete by themselves with the major powers, and could survive only by joining forces.

Unfortunately, our governments became quickly unable to understand Italy’s limitations and weaknesses and, believing their nation had reached power status, they started soon seeking territorial gains in the Balkans region, especially on the coast, disregarding the fact that all ethnicities were already at odds among them for conflicting territorial claims, with each attempting to “restore the borders of their respective Medieval kingdoms at the moment of their maximum territorial expansion”.

As this general attitude by the Balkan ethnicities was clearly the application of the so-called principle of “Historical Claims”, the likelihood for Italy of  being repelled and/or spoiling the good relations established during the XIX century was great: the subsequent events were an ample demonstration of the risks inherent in this imprudent policy.

Notwithstanding the warnings by those who knew the situation, and pushed instead for a policy of smoothing the differences existing among the parties concerned, many Italian governments persisted in its attitude, to such a point that our interest for territorial acquisitions in the Balkans was explicitly acknowledged in the treaty of the Triple Alliance with Austria and Germany, on our request.

In fact, its article VII stated that any temporary or permanent occupation of territory in that region, by one member, could not take place without “a previous agreement between the two powers, based on the principle of a mutual compensation for any territorial advantage”.

It is therefore easy to understand why in 1908, when Austria established its protectorate over Bosnia without informing our government, and later refused to provide territorial compensations for this annexation, Italy intensified its “rounds of waltz” with the Entente, took position in favor of France, during the Moroccan dispute, and eventually declared its neutrality when the crisis of Sarajevo sparked WWI.

As it was clear that neutralism in this struggle for life and death was not a solution, the Italian government decided to negotiate with both parties, in order to reap the maximum possible benefits from our intervention on either side, as our key goal was to complete the unification of our country. When it became clear that Vienna was unwilling to offer anything, except minor modifications to the land borders, thus keeping many among our fellow nationals under her rule, Italy decided to pursue an agreement with the Entente, before declaring war against Austria.

During the negotiations, which led to the Treaty of London with France and Great Britain, Italy had her claims for territorial enlargement inserted in the text; these claims were, basically, three:

– all territories south of the Alps, in order to reach our “natural border”. This would have implied the annexation of territories hosting some Austrian-speaking populations, and therefore ran against the “Nationality” principle;

– Istria, Rijeka, some islands of Dalmatia, plus a significant part of the northern part of its coast, both in accordance with the “Nationality” principle, as well as for strategic reasons, due to the configuration of the Adriatic coasts;

– Southwestern Anatolia, where many Venetian settlements had existed in the past, in accordance with the principle of “Historical Claims”.

As you might see, our special interest to have a foothold in the Balkans was reaffirmed; however, the Italian disproportionate requests, based on a mix of conflicting and contradictory rationales, were acknowledged only in part by the other two allies, even if they could not reject the majority of our claims at this stage, having the desperate need to involve us in the war.

There was, in fact, another partial justification for this apparently unrealistic attitude by Italy, on the issue of Dalmatia: as Prime Minister Orlando said, our sandy and open coastline in the Adriatic is “vulnerable to any attack coming from the opposite shore. The situation is such that the power holding the other coast could always bomb Italian towns and return safely to its anchorages (before any reaction take place). Italy will never be secure without having a defensive base in the middle of the other shore”.

During WWI, in fact, the Austrians had been able both to seriously damage our coastal towns and to disrupt our communications between the northern and the southern parts of the Adriatic, while enjoying the possibility of moving freely behind the curtain provided by the islands of Dalmatia, and keeping their forces in safe havens. The Italian Navy had to display a lot of imagination and to design new types of vessels to allow the many daring endeavors which led to the sinking of three enemy battleships.

Only the southern part of the Adriatic, though, presents a more favorable situation, as this part has deep waters and is wider; this enabled us to block any access to the Mediterranean to the Austrian fleet, but allowed us, more importantly, to rescue, in 1916, the Serbian Army retreating to Northern Albania while fighting bravely under the overwhelming combined attack from Austria and Bulgaria. Later in that war, Italians and Serbians fought together on the Salonika front – supplied through the southern Adriatic sea – which proved decisive for the final victorious outcome of the World War.

But, sooner or later, the moment of truth comes: all the contradictions inherent in our territorial claims were exposed during the peace negotiations, at the end of the war, to such an extent that the US President Wilson, who had not subscribed the London treaty, refused to heed to Italian pressures, as he was seeking, in his “Fourteen Points” declaration, a new world order based on the principles of nationality and justice.

With special reference to the Italian claims over Dalmatia, the Declaration stated that, as the Austrian Empire had disappeared, Italy had nothing to fear from the opposite shore of the Adriatic. Point XI in the declaration, in fact, said that: “Serbia should have free and secure access to the sea; and the relations between all Balkans States should be defined through amicable agreements along historical lines established in accordance with the principles of subjection and nationality”. You might notice that, while the first part of the statement was fair and reasonable, its last part was in fact a sort of “Mission Impossible”, due to the bad feelings running high among the populations of the Balkans.

What Italy feared, in fact, was a Yugoslavia becoming friend of France, a situation implying great risks, with the possibility of a war on two fronts; our government did not understand, though, that the Italian claims were compelling Belgrade – so far deeply grateful to Rome – to seek an alliance with Paris, in order to protect the new nation of Yugoslavia from our pressures.

What followed was precisely this, especially as our governments were unable to stem the popular pressure, moved by the rhetoric of the “Mutilated Victory”. The fall of the liberal regime and the advent of Mussolini – who exploited this widespread discontent – made matters worse, as Italy supported the separatist movements in Yugoslavia, in the following years.

The consequences were first that, by the end of WWII, a number of massacres had plagued both sides and that afterwards Yugoslavia claimed territories where both populations lived, including the eastern part of Friuli – Venezia Giulia; the majority of the Italian residents in Istria were forced to take refuge in our country – a mass evacuation which left additional bitter feelings. Once again, therefore, relations with Yugoslavia reached their ebb.

The winners, though, did not want such a confrontation to continue, as Yugoslavia had decided not to rally the Warsaw Pact, and therefore imposed a settlement over the issue of Istria and Trieste: the fact that both parties were left bitterly disappointed is an indicator that the agreement was the best possible at the time, given the bad relations between them.

Once Italy had solved the remaining issues pending with Yugoslavia, even at the high cost of nearly a hundred thousand refugees and a bitter internal discontent for the “excessive renunciations”, the conditions for restoring the good relations of the past were set, and the Italian government eventually decided to follow a strategy of friendship and cooperation, very much coherent with the measures undertaken in a similar case, Alto Adige, by De Gasperi. Needless to say, they proved as effective as their precedent.

Why Italy, after having opposed Yugoslavia for decades, was now willing to improve bilateral relations, in spite of all odds? The geostrategic situation, after WWII, had drastically changed, with Italy and France in the same Alliance, united by the common fear of the Soviet power. Yugoslavia had become at the same time a stalwart to stem a possible invasion, as well as being the bridge to create that sort of “Economic Interdependence”  with the Soviet Block which proved to be the foremost success factor.

Therefore, during the Cold War, Yugoslavia performed a key role for Italian security, as she was the buffer  between us and the forces of the Warsaw Pact. As a former Italian president, Francesco Cossiga, said: “we must be eternally grateful to Yugoslavia, otherwise we should have devoted a much greater part of our incomes to weapons, at the expenses of collective welfare”. In fact, there was also an agreement between Belgrade and the USA, whose forces would have cooperated in the defense of the Ljubljana gap against the Red Army.

The treaty of Osimo, signed on November 10, 1975 was the final seal which sanctioned the new feeling of mutual confidence and economic cooperation, as it existed before Italy had pursued her power game. The fact that all States of former Yugoslavia have quickly ratified it, after having reached their independence, shows how important and reassuring it was for them.

However, nothing could be done to appease the internal dissents among populations in the Balkans: the first striking instance involved Hungary, when her government signed in 1991, after more than forty years, a peace treaty with Romania and had to resign, having accepted that Transylvania became part of Romania; but more was to follow.

The civil war of 1991-1995 in former Yugoslavia was the other major instance; the Italian government attempted in vain to prevent this bloodshed, through its good offices, while struggling to avoid isolating Belgrade, thus restraining the other Western nations, and keeping in check the internal pressure to exploit the situation and take back the “Unredeemed territories” of Istria. Only after having been compelled to acknowledge that the inter ethnic hatred was too high to be managed either by diplomacy or by the UN, Italy had no choice other than participating to the NATO and WEU operations, which succeeded first in limiting the violence of the conflict and then in bringing it to a halt.

But no brokerage can succeed in a region whose nationalities are unwilling to cooperate, separated as they are by centuries of bad mutual feelings. Therefore other dramatic events plagued the region again: The Kosovo war was a bitter moment for Italy, split between its allegiance to the Western caucus and its friendship toward Serbia. Of course, the huge flow of refugees from that province was the factor which moved the public opinions and compelled Western nations to intervene, under the NATO hat.

Italy, which had initially taken only defensive measures, along its Adriatic coast, felt compelled to provide the air bases for the strategic bombing – albeit refusing to participate directly to it. It was not easy, but there was no escape, as an Italian refusal would have undermined the whole operation, and NATO’s effectiveness is for us a vital interest, allowing us to devolve enough resources to social development.

The same situation has occurred more recently, during NATO operations over Libya: our government had to decide whether or not opening our airbases to NATO forces, and allowed them to operate from our territory, notwithstanding the fact that, as in the former case, the operation was against our best interests.

The Italian participation to the stabilization of Kosovo has not been the only action carried out, during the most recent years, and our diplomacy is still busy in quieting down the hard feelings among Balkan nations: the most recent effort, still ongoing, is aimed at solving the differences between Slovenia and Croatia about their land and maritime borders, another instance of how hard the feelings are among the Balkan nations.

Which is the possible way ahead for Western Balkans, as it is seen in Italy? As in all areas plagued by centuries-old disputes, we are fully aware that no redefinition of borders is feasible, nor any return to the past is practicable, as it would create more discontent and instability; therefore, there is only one remaining way to follow, i.e. the cooptation in the European Union of all Balkans’ nations, on the basis of EU three underlying principles:

– overcome together the memory of the past rivalries and of the two World Wars;

– renounce to any hegemonic attempt among nations;

– avoid frontier claims.

The latter problem had been solved in Western Europe by the Schengen treaty of 1985, leading to a sort of “Dilution of Borders”: consider how many territorial disputes, all around Europe, have lost their emphasis thanks to this treaty – including our bitterness toward Slovenia – and you will understand why Italy is sponsoring the inclusion in the EU of all Western Balkan States: when populations have been inextricably mixed up, according to the past interest of struggling powers, the extension of Schengen provisions to the Balkans could be the only way to prevent further clashes and allow existing hatred to fade away with time.

The role of the Balkans, and Serbia in particular, as seen in Italy, is to become the bridge between East and West, i.e. the European Union and Russia, whose demographic decay has reached worrying proportions. Europe and Russia desperately need each other, in order to acquire an economic dimension, the “Critical Mass”, allowing us to influence events in the world, and this will be possible only thanks to the Balkan States. Should we fail in this endeavor, the whole of the European landmass will not be able to progress and to have a positive impact in the multi – polar world, the dominant feature of the XXI century.

Address at the NATO Study Tour, organized by the Italian Atlantic Committee in cooperation with the Atlantic Council of Serbia, 4-8 June, 2012.