Events in the Middle East over the past six months have shattered long-standing paradigms and strategies. Correctly observing the inherent strategic uncertainties, Secretary Clinton likened any attempt to address the evolving regional situation as playing multi-dimensional Chess of an unprecedented scope.
Recent Western official attempts however, to address political change in the Middle East have revealed piecemeal thinking. President Obama’s May 19 speech and the European Union’s “new and ambitious” Neighborhood Policy are couched in nostalgic romanticism evocating Western mass protests for self-determination, be it the Boston Tea Party or the Velvet Revolution in Czechoslovakia. These articulations assume that progress and democracy will eventually prevail with hardly any need for external intervention. Western statements share the anticipation that the Arab Middle East will follow the 1990s’ path of Central and Eastern European countries transforming into liberal democracies. The Arab Middle East however, is expected to transform with a fraction of the political and financial support offered by the United States and Europe to the post-Communist bloc. Middle East 2011 however, is less adaptable than Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s.
Thus, Western strategy appears to be predicated on “dump and hope”. Indeed, new Western doctrines all but ignore the overwhelming challenges of radicalism and development, which will most likely thwart the ambitions for installing “deep and sustainable democracy” (as suggested by the European Union). Furthermore, these challenges do not bode well for enhancing regional security or for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict, which are cornerstones of Western interests in the Middle East.
The Western dismal track record in the Middle East over the past decade combined with the political and economic crises facing the US and Europe give considerable impetus to downsize Western regional commitments to the bare minimum and to direct political and financial capital to restore Western power. This downsizing approach well fits the Western preference to allow the Middle East political turmoil to run its natural course.
The “restoration” strategy is not without merit. For two principal reasons however, the West ought to find a more reasonable balance between pressing obligations at home and duties abroad. First, developments in the Middle East have underscored that although Western projection of influence, power, and credibility have diminished, there is no substitute for the US and Europe in sharing the burden to maintain and advance regional peace, security and prosperity. Although flawed and half-hearted, the Western role in Libya is consequential. Despite Iraqi yearning for the final withdrawal of US forces, a political cross-party consensus supporting continued US military presence is growing clout in Baghdad.
Furthermore, the strategic posture of Western allies in the Middle East is intertwined with American and European power and influence.
Second, and perhaps more important, a Western credible and effective role in the Middle East is not a matter of charity. Strategic calamity in the Middle East would pose a threat to the long-standing interests of the West vis-à-vis the Middle East: curtailing the export of violence and instability to Europe and North America through terror, WMD proliferation, and radical indoctrination; maintaining energy security; and preserving maritime security along the main global shipping routes crossing, and adjacent to, the Middle East. An indicative example for a potential Middle East calamity would be a terrorist attack targeting a major oil producing facility in Saudi Arabia, which is not a far-fetched scenario. In February 2006, al Qaida operatives attacked Saudi Arabia’s main oil processing facility in Abqaiq, perhaps the world’s most important petroleum hub. The Abqaiq facility, as most of Saudi Arabia’s oil fields and facilities, is located in the Eastern province of Saudi Arabia, which is home to the 15% Shiite minority of the Kingdom and physically borders the Persian Gulf. The Saudi government is long weary of Iranian meddling in this province neighboring Bahrain. Furthermore, the US role in toppling Egypt’s Mubarak is viewed in Riyadh as a proof of the unreliability of the West. In turn, this has served to heighten Saudi sense of anxiety vis-à-vis a growingly aggressive Iran. Against the backdrop of Saudi insecurity, a terrorist plot targeting a major oil facility could unleash a severe Saudi response and set into motion an escalating crisis which might put the entire Persian Gulf on the brink, threaten main maritime routes, and would have oil prices skyrocket. The occurrence of a similar scenario would take a considerable toll on Western welfare and further deepen the world economic crisis.
Nonetheless, the Arab-Israeli conflict seems to have gained most of the attention in Western policy circles, particularly in Europe. Apparently, the prevalent conventional wisdom is that this protracted conflict is the primary challenge in the Middle East; its resolution would solve many of the challenges in the region; and that the only hurdle to the conflict’s resolution is Israel. While resolving the conflict is essential and urgent for Israel’s national security, the conflict is by far not the primary threat to regional security and Western interests in the Middle East. The onus for the current stalemate is not exclusively Israeli. Rather, the mismanagement of US-led efforts over the past few years had a more considerable impact. As President Abbas has repeatedly stated, the main US contribution to the peace process has been the unending supply of tall ladders removed immediately after the Palestinians obligingly climbed to the top of the highest tree in the Middle East forest. The borderline-obsession with the Israeli-Palestinian peace process leads Western policy-makers to pay excessive attention to tactical episodic events (for instance, the Gaza flotilla or the expected Palestinian UN showdown in September), rather than taking a broad strategic view of the region.
Thus, the US and Europe fail to acknowledge the intertwined nature of the three primary challenges in the Middle East, namely: the growing political power and influence of Iran, its proxies and Islamist radical forces; socio-economic and political under-development; last and least, the Arab-Israeli conflict.
Without addressing these challenges simultaneously, there is no chance to achieve progress on any track. Unless contained and checked, radical forces will derail a serious peace process and any negotiated agreement. The cause of good governance and human rights will not advance if radical forces are allowed to assume political power. Global private sector investments and public resources essential for improving living conditions in the Middle East will not be forthcoming if destabilizing radical Islamist forces will dominate “new” regimes in the region. Finally, it will be nearly impossible to contain radical forces and facilitate political development without (really) moving the peace process forward. Only a coherent and realistic approach conscious of the regional complex interdependencies might prevail.
Unlike Western powers, regional parties are starting to contend with shifting balances of power and interests. The politically boosted power of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt is already leading this country to seek new relations with the radical and terrorist forces in the region – namely Iran and Hamas. Concerned by the breakaway of Egypt, the growing assertiveness of Iran, and the sense of US betrayal, Saudi Arabia and its partners to the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) are moving to enlarge this Forum to include Jordan, a clear posturing message to both Iran and a radicalizing Egypt.
These trends do not bode well for regional security or for the hope that democracy and peace will prevail in the region.
The task of enhancing security and progress in the Middle East and preventing its rapid deterioration will not be an easy or short feat for the US and Europe or their allies in the region. In this undertaking, Western powers ought not to assume this burden alone, but rather engage and work with real regional allies, not the Muslim Brotherhood.
A new grand bargain needs creative conceptualization. To illustrate, contemporary Middle East could benefit from the out-of-the-box thinking that was so essential for initiating European integration via the Marshall Plan or for accommodating a unified Germany through the Maastricht Treaty founding the European Union. Regionalism may not necessarily be the answer for the Middle East, but such ingenuity that looks at the broader regional strategic landscape is now critical for the future of the Middle East.
The possible contours for a new grand bargain would involve forming a Western-led regional pro-peace and security coalition. This would require the US and Europe to amend fences and reassure the strategic concerns of long-standing Western allies in the region in return for their active and positive role in addressing the region’s common challenges – radicalism, development and the peace process.
Credible Western strategic assurances to its regional allies could contain the ambitions of radical forces, particularly Iran and its proxies, and alleviate the sense of insecurity of Saudi Arabia and other GCC members. Demonstrating these assurances would not necessarily be politically costly and could include political signaling (official visits and effective statements in the region), the revitalization of US CENTCOM’s regional security architecture, and the application of NATO assurances as part of its new partnership policy. Although these assurances are in the interest of the West, GCC countries could be expected, in reciprocity, to undertake domestic measures to enhance good governance and to curb the export of Sunni radicalism to South Asia and Europe and its financing.
Furthermore, the GCC could assume a major role in regional socio-economic development along with international organizations and the global private sector. This would not be a handout. The radical forces in the region fester under the current socio-economic conditions. For instance, more than 30 percent of the young adults (18-29 years old) in the region are unemployed and 51 million new jobs are needed by 2020 only to avoid a further increase in unemployment rates. The final element of a possible grand bargain would have the GCC along with Jordan and Morocco take an active role in the Arab-Israeli peace process. A responsible Arab pro-peace coalition could limit the role of Hamas and a radicalizing Egypt and with the Quartet mentor the peace process, substituting the extremist Arab League. In expanding the negotiating setting, this coalition could offer pan-Arab political support to the Palestinians in taking the difficult decisions to move ahead in resolving the conflict with Israel. This coalition would also expand the menu of tangible strategic and political benefits for Israel in attaining a final settlement with the Palestinians and increase Israeli public support for the peace process.
A comprehensive final status may not be in the cards in the immediate future. Despite the Palestinian rejection of a formal long-term interim agreement, there is ample room for a series of concerted measures by Israel, the Palestinians and a propeace Arab coalition. These measures could be based on the continued fulfillment of the Roadmap obligations undertook by Israel and the Palestinian Authority and accepting the spirit of the Arab Peace Initiative and its explicit equation – normalization for peace. The concerted measures should be simultaneously implemented in the Israeli-Palestinian and the Israeli-Arab countries tracks. These concerted measures will not lead overnight to a comprehensive peace deal, but might break the deadlock, create a momentum for productive negotiations on the final status focusing on borders and security arrangements, and promote regional security by reinforcing the pro-peace coalition.
As we approach the 20th anniversary of the 1991 Madrid Middle East Peace Conference, time has come for a new grand bargain in the Middle East. In historical terms, the popular revolts across the Arab world have created an elastic moment during which the future of the Middle East will take shape for years to come. While as hitherto Western preference has been to allow this process to “naturally” evolve, the inherent risks to regional and global security and welfare warrant a far more politically proactive, creative and informed effort jointly executed by the West and its allies in the region.
English version of the article “Ein Augenblick der Formbarkeit: Im Nahen Osten besteht die Chance auf einen kreativen Lösungsansatz,” published in Internationale Politik vol. 66, no.5, September-October 2011, pp. 74-79.