The recent developments in Tunisia represent a valuable case study for analyzing the current status and the future perspectives of the partnership initiatives launched in the last decades by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU) in the Mediterranean region.
In this regard, the reason to focus on Tunisia is threefold. Firstly, Tunisia has been the first country in the region to experience the season of political and social change known as the “Arab Spring” and is currently in the very middle of a promising, yet uncertain institutional transition.
Secondly, Tunisia has assumed a key strategic relevance because of the political and military developments which have taken place in Lybia in the past weeks. Such events might indeed make Tunisia an essential hub for managing the post‒war reconstruction of that country, but they also pose crucial challenges for its own stability.
Thirdly and finally, Tunisia represents a key partner in Italy’s regional policy, due to the relevant and long‒standing political, economic and cultural ties linking our two countries, which – as we will argue in the final section of this paper – should be further developed in the light of a changing regional outlook.
In this view, our paper aims at firstly providing a comparative assessment of the evolution of NATO and EU partnerships in the Mediterranean region, by evaluating the balance between resources and results in their regional initiatives, also in the context of the current challenges posed by the so‒called “Arab Spring”.
We will then focus on a concise analysis of the current security, socio‒economic and institutional outlook of Tunisia. In this regard, a special attention will be attached to the scrutiny of the main vulnerability points for the country’s overall stability, among which the situation of refugees from Lybia, conventional and unconventional attacks to its territory, persisting corruption, underdevelopment and political transition.
We will finally draw some conclusive remarks on the status of Euro‒Atlantic partnerships in the Mediterranean region, by insisting on the need for a more integrated and coordinated approach to effectively cope with the numerous challenges affecting Tunisia’s long‒term security and development. In this regard, we will also recommend a series of political and technical initiatives that should be taken in order to ensure a democratic and stable transition in the country.
NATO and EU Partnerships in the Mediterranean: A Comparative Assessment
The analysis of the cooperation between Tunisia, NATO and the EU needs to be integrated within the wider framework of the regional policies brought about by those two Organizations in the Mediterranean.
As a matter of fact, NATO and the EU represent the only two regional Organizations able to develop a series of wide and well‒structured partnership initiatives in the Mediterranean, thus witnessing the traditional interest of their member countries in enhancing stability and development in an area which has undergone a process of geopolitical transition after the end of the Cold War and remains affected by a wide range of threats, such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), illegal human and drug trafficking and piracy.
This seems even more relevant if we take into consideration the state-of-the‒art of international cooperation in the region, which is marked by a multiplicity of players (from the G8 to OSCE to the 5+5 and many other “mini-multilateral” initiatives) on the one hand, and a general lack of coherence and coordination, on the other. In this regard, both NATO and the EU made possible the establishment of unified, yet complex managing structures, designed to face the numerous challenges of the region and harmonize, at least to some extent, a complex framework of often competing bilateral relations. Nonetheless, comparing the balance between resources and outputs in the two Organizations’ initiatives leads to rather striking results.
The EU, on the one hand, has launched a wide series of ambitious and multidimensional projects in the last forty years, starting from the Global Mediterranean Policy, to the European Neighborhood Policy and the most recent Union for the Mediterranean. In this framework, the EU has devoted considerable resources by either alternating or juxtaposing multilateral and bilateral approaches in many different areas, such as development aids, governance reforms, human rights protection, infrastructural enhancement and intra‒regional cooperation.
However, at the break of the Arab Spring, the global outlook of the EU initiatives in the region seemed flawed by a general lack of concrete outputs, in particular regarding the ultimate goal of encouraging a benign process linking democratization, development and intra‒regional cooperation. In this regard, the changes taking place on the southern shores of the Mediterranean have underlined the deficiencies of the political vision at the basis of the EU regional initiatives ‒ in particular, the paralysis affecting the Union for the Mediterranean – while stressing the need for new formulas in the Euro‒Mediterranean cooperation process. The necessities of a realistic re-assessment have become manifest during an extraordinary meeting of the European Council last March, which provided an opportunity to shape a new cooperation strategy, especially in the sense of strengthening the nexus between EU financial assistance and democratic reforms in recipient countries. However, many doubts remain about the capacity of the European Union to devote extensive political and financial resources to the Euro‒Mediterranean cooperation process, especially due to the alarming priorities called for by the current sovereign debt crisis.
On the contrary, the action of NATO in the region seems marked by a better balance between resources and concrete results. In particular, the launch of the Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) in mid-Nineties coincided with NATO’s prominent transformation after the end of the Cold War and was further developed in the light of new threats affecting the area, above all transnational terrorism and proliferation of WMDs. The Mediterranean Dialogue has thus aimed at reinforcing cooperation and stability in the region, by providing MD partners with a toolbox of political and practical instruments, on the basis of the principles of cooperative security, ownership and flexibility.
From a political point of view, the MD in fact represents a key forum for regular diplomatic consultations on a wide range of issues that are relevant to the regional security outlook, also encouraging the adoption of new cooperation dimensions. Moreover, from a practical point of view, MD members proved capable and willing to develop measures of cooperation including civil emergency planning, border security, small arms and light weapons, defense and security reform and economics, scientific and environmental cooperation as well as consultations on terrorism and proliferation of WMDs. Moreover, the initiative has been essential in order to enhance MD partners’ military interoperability with the armed forces of NATO members, as in the case of Operation Active Endeavour (OAE).
On the whole, NATO’s Mediterranean partnership initiatives, though being more specific and less ambitious than the ones undertaken by the European Union, have led to some remarkable results by both engaging the two shores of the Mediterranean in a progressively shared conception of the common security challenges and by representing a potential forum for intra‒regional cooperation in a traditionally secretive and sovereignty-centered sector. The political and practical relevance of the Mediterranean Dialogue has been recently highlighted in NATO’s new Strategic Concept, adopted by the Heads of State and Government at the Lisbon Summit in November 2010 and it has also been emphasized within NATO’s Partnerships Policy in last April.
The brief analysis conducted so far allow us to highlight the major features of the regional partnership initiatives of NATO and the EU: on the one hand, the plurality – or, as some may say, the congestion – of international cooperation programs in the area; on the other hand, the need for a better balance between resources and outputs. Having introduced the wider framework of the international cooperation network in the region, it is now possible to discuss the main vulnerability points currently faced by Tunisia, after the outbreak of the so‒called “Jasmine Revolution”.
Tunisia’s Current Security, Socio-Economic and Institutional Outlook
In this regard, three major fields need a very special attention: national security, socio-economic conditions of Tunisians and, finally, institutional reforms.
The first one is the security issue related to external governance. The ongoing conflict in Libya made things more complicated for Tunisia on a double level: that of attacks on borders (either by loyalist forces or by terrorists from Algeria) and the one of the refugees coming from Libya.
Concerning the first point rocket firing and incursions by the Libyan loyalist forces have been reported in the south of Tunisia during last spring, as well as the infiltration of terrorist groups through the Algerian border. This has led public authorities to employ F5 helicopters alongside the Libyan border and to send vehicles to patrol the desert and the mountains. It has also been reported that, in May, more than 200 Libyan soldiers have been caught on the border, disarmed and sent back to Libya, while rockets fired by Kaddafi’s loyalist forces reached the surroundings of the village of Dehibia, after an aborted offensive assault against the Wazzan frontier post, which was held by Libyan rebels. As a consequence, Tunisia threatened to seize the United Nations in order to defend its territorial integrity from such attacks. On top of that, the Tunisian transitional government sent most of its army and national guard forces in the south and in the west of Tunisia, in order to control its borders with Algeria and Libya, depriving the rest of Tunisian territory of most of its troops, despite the sporadic violence still reported in the country. Moreover, two groups of individuals of Algerian and Libyan nationality have been recently arrested in the south: it has been eventually found out that they were preparing terrorist attacks on the Tunisian territory.
It has been announced that the number of refugees who ran away from Libya to Tunisia are currently estimated at 900,000, together with 60,000 Tunisian expatriates fleeing the country. More than 6,000 entered Tunisia in the second week of June, according to the Tunisian Ministry of Defense. The situation in the refugee camps is of great concern: cases of rapes, dysentery and scabies have been reported, despite the on-field presence of the Tunisian army and medical teams, the UNCHR, UNFPA and several NGOs. What is more, according to UNHCR, with the exception of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya – which is a member of the Organization of African Unity’s 1969 Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa – all Northern African States have ratified the 1951 Refugee Convention and its 1967 Protocol, but no country – except Mauritania – has adopted a national refugee legislation, nor has it established asylum procedures consistent with international standards. Apart from the daily management of refugee camps, Tunisian authorities also participated in the repatriation of several foreigners, among whom Asian and Eastern European citizens. Nevertheless, lots of cities, like Djerba, are sensing that the tourist season is threatened by these movements.
As for the issue of internal governance, acts of sporadic violence are still reported in Tunisia, mostly caused by former members of the RCD and prisoners who managed to escape from jails in different part of the territory. Some of these acts are also due to sympathizers of the religious Ennahdha movement. For instance, a female member of the Parti Démocrate Progressiste has been reported to have been assaulted by a follower of this movement in the city of Sfax, in the south. Besides, acts of vandalism, such as the fire arson of a bar in the north of Tunisia are said to be criminal acts of followers of the Ennahdha movement. Very recently, 1000 national guards have been sent to the city of Metlaoui, in the south.
Intense fights, including the use of Molotov bombs and the fire arson of the local market, have opposed local tribes for the ownership of the Compagnie des Phosphates in Gafsa. Others tend to argue that, behind the tribal fight, there would be actually a clash opposing former members of the RCD and smugglers close to the Trabelsi family. Also, acts of violence from the police have been reported in different cities and the acting Prime Minister Beji Caid Essebsi has threatened to dismantle the trade union of policemen.
From the socio-economic point of view – according to the acting Prime Minister – Tunisia needs 5 billion Tunisian dinars in order to face the current state of emergency. He also stressed the fact that Tunisia does not need donations, but investments. Besides, it has been announced that, for the year 2011, the growth rate will not be superior to +1%.
The socio-economic outlook of Tunisia can be mainly presented from two major points of view. The first one regards corruption. Corruption has been made rampant during Ben Ali’s regime. Any economic innovation had to pass by the Palace of Cartago, the official seat of the former Tunisian government. For instance, Sakhr el-Materi, the son-in-law of Ben Ali, created his own airline company which entered into a fierce competition with Tunisair. Besides, the Ben Ali and the Trabelsi families own the major shares of the biggest companies in every market sector (hotels, airports, insurances and banks). The Trabelsi family also confiscated farm fields, thus managing to control the internal agricultural market. The whole corruption system was even institutionalized through programs, like the so-called “26-26 Program”. According to Mr. Abelfattah Amor, President of the National Commission for Fact‒Finding on Cases of Bad Practices and Corruption, the fight against corruption needs to create the conditions for trust among the population, through the restitution of ill-gotten gains. The latter eventually called for the creation of a Truth-Justice-Reconciliation Committee. In fact, 40 to 60% of national wealth is presumed to have been detained by the Trabelsi-Ben Ali families.
The allies of the regime were not submitted to taxes; therefore, the tax system and the banking sector need to be re-built on a healthier basis. Besides, the job market needs to be restructured as well. Despite most of the people who took part to the Revolution were educated youth, nepotism was very common under Ben Ali’s regime. As a consequence, most of RCD members obtained jobs they were not qualified for.
The second point of view concerns the deep development gap between the regions of the north and those of the south.After the fall of Ben Ali, Tunisians have been struck by pictures of very poor Tunisian villages whose existence they did not even know about, thus revealing the systematic manipulation used by the former regime. That also stressed out the extreme lack of infrastructure in Tunisia. Recently, a highway has been constructed – yet not finished – between Tunis and El Kef, which should be around 150 km-long. Only 60 km or so have been so far completed.
The serious lack of infrastructure finds its roots in a completely unbalanced regional policy. 80% of the development funds were attributed to the north only. A planning body has been created recently to think about a reformed regional governance, gathering four governorates from the north-west (Béja, El Kef, Jendouba and Séliana). The idea of a federal state has been proposed recently by different personalities and political parties, in order to reach a more efficient governance of the country and also to respect the local specificities of each region.
Finally, another issue the future Tunisian government will have to address is the protection of the Tunisian cultural heritage. During the last decades, lots of artifacts have been stolen from Tunisia and sold in the European market. The Trabelsi and Ben Ali clans also took part in this illicit trafficking. In this field, international cooperation is definitely needed, especially from countries which, like Italy, can provide a deep-rooted expertise.
As for the institutional reforms which are to be considered as fundamental, after the fall of Ben Ali and his regime the suspension of the 1959 Constitution has been decided upon the basis of article 57. Tunisia has now a transitional government which is supposed to deal with urgent matters and prepare the field for the election of a Constituent Assembly. The latter will be in charge of drafting a new Constitution.
The election of the Assembly was first scheduled for July, 24. But, after long hesitation, the interim government announced that the elections are to be postponed to October, 23, following the proposition of the Electoral Commission. The reason for this delay is that this would be the only way to secure transparent and trustworthy elections. As a matter of fact, around 100 political parties have been created, but they still have to organize themselves for the electoral campaign. The list of electors has been created this summer, but observers still need to be trained. All this takes time, in a country were elections have been a mascarade for so many years. The electoral system is also an institutional matter that will have to be addressed urgently.
The protection of women’s legal status, created by the former Tunisian President Bourguiba, will also have to be guaranteed. Tunisian women have been an important component of the Tunisian Revolution and they now fear the impact of the permission given to the religious movement Ennahdha to access the political arena. Women’s status is likely to be declared unchangeable, as fears of its future weakening are serious. As a matter of fact, the influence of media from Gulf countries – as well as their supposed involvement in the financing of the Ennahdha movement for the electoral campaign – is challenging the traditional secularism of the country’s institutions and some might exploit this to question the freedoms of Tunisian women.
More generally, the new political framework in Tunisia is still very dynamic and unpredictable, being composed of a mix of very diverse entities that are taking part in the transition in Tunisia, such as political movements, trade unions and associations.
Concluding Remarks: An Integrated Euro‒Atlantic Assistance Mission in Tunisia?
As we have tried to highlight briefly in this paper, the ongoing transition in Tunisia poses a significant challenge to the International Community and, more specifically, to the role of the Euro‒Atlantic Institutions in the region.
The so-called “Arab Spring” represents an unparalleled phenomenon for the entire region, which has long been characterized by authoritarian regimes, underdevelopment and conflicts. Nonetheless, its mid-term perspectives remain uncertain and might still result in a serious threat to the stability of the political and security landscape of the Mediterranean region.
In fact, on the one hand, the “domino effect” that some have been predicting from the very beginning of the Jasmine Revolution has not yet taken place; on the contrary, the region still seems beset by the prevailing of largely undemocratic systems and methods. On the other hand, both Tunisia and Egypt are now marked by a delicate transitional phase in which ad interim governments have to face growing expectations and requests from the heterogeneous political and social movements which have taken part in the upheavals. In such a complex transition, the way remains open for either populist or radical leaders to gain consensus, both weakening an already fragile statehood and exposing the regional landscape to the risks of fragmentation and political rivalry.
In such a rapidly changing context, transition in Tunisia nonetheless represents a promising study case on a twofold level. From an internal point of view, the country is characterized by a vibrant political landscape, with a rising civil society and a cultural tradition of modernism and tolerance, despite the many uncertainties of this pre-elections period. From an international point of view, a fully democratic Tunisia would certainly be an accountable partner for the stabilization of the area, especially in the light of the relevant ongoing shifts in the geopolitical regional balance, which deeply affect both the interests and the values of the Euro-Atlantic institutions.
To this end, the International Community should include the enhancement of Tunisia’s security, stability and development among the objectives of its political agenda. In this view, the role of both NATO and the EU seems crucial and must be developed on the basis of two underlying principles: division of tasks and operational coordination.
First of all, the two Organizations should conclude an ad hoc cooperation agreement for realizing a joint assistance mission in the country. Such an agreement should task the European Union with the management of humanitarian and development aids as well as with the general monitoring of the internal institutional and socio-political reforms, which seem pivotal for allowing the rule of law to take its roots in the country. In this specific area, a special attention should be devoted to eradicate the plague of corruption in both private sectors and public institutions. Moreover, particular importance should be attached to the resources and the expertise of the European Commission in the field of humanitarian and development cooperation, which make it able to interact effectively with on-field players, such as the UN bodies and NGOs. Such an interaction should urgently aim at the protection of refugees and other potentially vulnerable subjects, especially women. At the same time, financing initiatives should be developed in the economic and infrastructural fields, on the basis of the existing thematic volets of the Union for the Mediterranean.
The same agreement should also give NATO the opportunity to contribute to the enhancement of Tunisia’s security landscape, starting from the assistance to the country’s defense and security forces in the fields of border security and the fight against transnational terrorism. Afterwards, a further contribution should come from NATO to the enhancement of both democratic reform and operational and doctrinal modernization of Tunisia’s defense and security forces, while reinforcing NATO-Tunisia relations within the wider framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue.
Such a process, which should be harmonized with the integration of Tunisia within the current partnership programs of the European Union, would finally allow the re-launching of the international role of Tunisia by making it a factor of stabilization and dialogue for the whole region. Moreover, not only would national democratic and transparent institutions represent a further guarantee of internal stability, but they would also secure the pacific interaction of Tunisia with other regional and extra-regional players.
Furthermore, proper operational coordination must be assured in order to avoid dangerous duplications and delays in the reinforcement of the country’s stability. The political, economic and even cultural potential of a stricter cooperation between Tunisia and the Euro-Atlantic Institutions demands a timely re-launching of the synergy between the two Organizations, which has long been obstructed by a range of technical, institutional and political difficulties.
This cooperation, which might also be extended in other forms to Lybia, could even represent a relevant pattern for future assistance and reconstruction initiatives outside the Mediterranean region, due to the growing need to combine common security concerns and declining defense budgets in major Western countries. This seems even more urgent in consideration of the new course of US foreign policy in the region. Once the only factor of stabilization in the area, the United States seem now more and more willing to task their European allies with greater responsibilities in assuring regional stability, as it has been witnessed by the adoption of the so-called “strategy from behind” during the Lybian crisis.
This ambitious goal will call, of course, for adequate resources and tools. But, above all, it will require a clear political vision, based on the awareness by all parties of the importance of international cooperation for common security and prosperity in the Mediterranean region.
In this context, we deem that Italy can and must play a leading role in the light of both its geopolitical position and its diplomatic and cultural tradition, which make it a unique intermediary between the Mediterranean and the Euro-Atlantic institutions. In this regard, Italy’s contribution should combine a general political engagement with the leadership of some technical projects in the wider framework of NATO and EU partnership initiatives.
In the field of NATO-led projects, Italy might host a training program for Tunisian mid-rank government officials and military officers, on the basis of a cooperation agreement between its Ministry of Foreign Affairs, its Ministry of Defense and NATO itself. This should eventually aim at the launching of an on-field training mission of Tunisia’s security and defense forces, thanks to the expertise of the Italian Carabinieri, as well as at the creation of a NATO Trust Fund promoting defense reform projects, without disregarding the industrial coté of such a mid-term modernization process.
In the field of the EU-led cooperation dimension, Italy’s contribution might involve the creation of an ad hoc financial institution to support the enhancement of small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) – which are becoming more and more involved in Lybia’s economic reconstruction – and infrastructure development, with the co-participation of the national banking sector and the contribution of governmental agencies such as SACE and SIMEST as well as the launching of a project on the protection of Tunisia’s archeological heritage, in close cooperation with the European Commission.
It is indeed our belief that a comprehensive national approach combining bottom-up logics and a renewed political guidance would allow Italy to give a fundamental contribution to the effectiveness of NATO and EU partnerships in the Mediterranean, while encouraging a hopefully rapid global agreement between the two Organizations.
Andrea Frontini is Research Fellow at the European Policy Center in Brussels. He holds both a B.A. and an M.A. in International Affairs and Diplomacy at the University of Trieste (Gorizia Campus), Italy, and a Postgraduate Degree in International Relations and Protection of Human Rights at the Italian Society for the International Organization (SIOI) of Rome, Italy.
Hana K. Missaoui holds a B.A. in Law and Public Administration and an M.A. in Public International and European Law at the University Paul Cézanne of Aix-en-Provence, France. She is also a Ph.D. candidate in Public Law at the same University. The paper solely reflects the personal views of the authors.
[1] For a comprehensive overview of the Italian post‒WWII foreign policy in the region, see also: Perfetti F., “La Politica Estera Italiana nel Mediterraneo e in Medio Oriente dopo la Seconda Guerra Mondiale”, La Comunità Internazionale, 2011.
[2] For a comprehensive description of Euro‒Atlantic cooperation in the region, see also: Aliboni R. and Colombo S., “Bilancio e Prospettive della Cooperazione Euro‒Mediterranea”, Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2011;
[3] European External Action Service, “Mediterranean Partner Countries”, 2011 (http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/external_relations/relations_with_third_countries/mediterranean_partner_countries/index_en.htm);
[4] See also: Comelli M., “L’UE Cambia Passo nel Mediterraneo”, Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2011;
[5] For a critical perspective on the role of NATO in the region, see also: Khalifa Isaac S., “NATO and Middle East and North Africa (MENA) Security”: Prospects for Burden Sharing”, Press of the NATO Defense College, 2011;
[6] For an additional analysis of the issue, see also: Luciolli F.W., “Lybia and the Challenges of International Organizations”, Longitude, March 2011;
[7] See also: NATO, “Strategic Concept for the Defense and Security of the North Atlantic Organization: Active Engagement, Modern Defense”, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2010 and NATO, “Active Engagement in Cooperative Security: A More Efficient and Flexible Partnership Policy”, NATO Public Diplomacy Division, 2011.
[8] Data in this section have been mostly taken from Tunisian daily newspapers and interviews with national and foreign experts in the country.
[9] See also: Human Rights Watch, « Tunisia : Protect Migrant Camp Residents”, Human Rights Watch Press, June 2011.
[10] See also : Réseau Euro‒Méditerranéen des Droits de l’Homme, « La Tunisie après le 14 Janvier et son Economie Politique et Sociale. Les Enjeux d’une Réconfiguration de la Politique Européenne », Press of the Réseau Méditerranéen des Droits de l’Homme, Spring 2011.
[11] See also: Amnesty International, “Time for Political Parties to Deliver Reform”, 2011 (www.amnesty.org/en/news-and-updates/report/time-tunisian-political-parties-deliver-reform-2011-09-27);
[12] An in‒depth analysis of the status of women in the country can also be found in: Charrad M., “States and Women’s Rights: The Making of Post‒Colonial Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco”, Press of the University of California, 2001.
[13] For an accurate overview of the institutional outlook in Tunisia, see also: Council of Europe, “The Council of Europe and the Arab Spring”, 2011 (http://www.coe.int/lportal/web/coe-portal/council-of-europe-and-arab-spring).
[14] For a comprehensive analysis of the geopolitical impact of the Arab Spring, see also : Aliboni R.,
“L’Orizzonte Strategico della Primavera Araba”, Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2011.
[15] See also : Rasmussen A. F., “NATO after Lybia: The Atlantic Alliance in Austere Times”, Foreign Affairs, July/August 2011 and Jean C., “Il Futuro della Libia tra NATO e UE”, Istituto Affari Internazionali, 2011.